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Abstract
The object of this thesis is to study several equilibrium selection methods for certain
classes of games and compare to what extent these selection methods lead to similar or
diﬀerent results. The thesis consists of ﬁve chapters.
Chapter 1 describes a theoretical framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the
graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence.
Chapter 2 analyzes the quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in detail
for 2× 2 bimatrix games.
Chapter 3 investigates the ultimatum game by a learning-mutation process related to
the quantal response equilibrium.
Chapter 4 studies two equilibrium selection methods based on the replicator dynamics.
Chapter 5 provides a economic experiment to show that social learning can lead to a
spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome
the free rider problem.
3
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation werden mehrere Methoden zur Gleichgewichtsselektion fu¨r gewisse
Klassen von Spielen studiert. Es wird untersucht, inwiefern diese Methoden zu a¨hnlichen
oder verschiedenen Resultaten fu¨hren. Die Dissertation besteht aus fu¨nf Kapiteln.
In Kapitel 1 werden die theoretischen Grundlagen einer Homotopiemethode entlang
des Graphen der quantal response Gleichgewichte beschrieben.
In Kapitel 2 wird diese Methodik im Detail auf 2× 2 Bimatrixspiele angewendet.
Kapitel 3 untersucht das Ultimatumspiel mittels eines Lern- und Mutationsprozesses.
Kapitel 4 widmet sich zwei weiteren Methoden der Gleichgewichtsauswahl, die auf der
Replikatorgleichung basieren.
Kapitel 5 stellt ein o¨konomisches Experiment vor, das zeigt, wie eine strafende Insti-
tution dem Problem der Trittbrettfahrer Herr werden kann.
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Preface
”In general, a given game may have several equilibria. Yet uniqueness is crucial to the
foregoing argument. Nash equilibrium makes sense only if each player knows which strate-
gies the others are playing; if the equilibrium recommended by the theory is not unique,
the players will not have this knowledge. Thus it is essential that for each game, the the-
ory selects one unique equilibrium from the set of all Nash equilibria.” -Robert Aumann
(foreword to Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)
In a game, if each player has chosen a strategy and no player can beneﬁt by changing
his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the set of strategy
choices is called a Nash equilibrium. Every game has at least one Nash equilibrium (Nash,
1950) but in general there are many. Trying to select the ”best” equilibrium for each game
is a diﬃcult problem. Methods to do this have been suggested by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), inventing the risk dominant equilibrium, and by many other researchers.
This thesis studies several equilibrium selection models. These models could be
roughly classiﬁed into two categories. Evolutionary game theory consider the behavior
of large populations, where individuals choose which actions to play genetically or using
simple myopic rules (e.g., best response, imitation). In contrast, learning models focus
on the behavior of small groups in repeated games. Individuals make decisions according
to explicit learning rules, which could be simple myopic rules (called heuristic learning
or adaptive learning) or more complicated Bayesian rules (called coordinated Bayesian
learning or rational learning). The heuristic learning is close to the spirit of evolutionary
approach. In the Bayesian learning, individuals play the best response to their beliefs
about other individuals’ strategies and update the beliefs over rounds.
One representative class of Bayesian learning methods consist of homotopy approaches,
such as the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988; Harsanyi, 1975) or the (one
parameter family of) quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998;
Turocy, 2005). In these models, individuals are usually considered boundedly rational
that may make mistakes in estimating the utilities of their strategies. As players gain
experience from repeated observations, they can be expected to make more precise esti-
mations and ﬁnally reach a Nash equilibrium. The tracing procedure always leads to the
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risk dominant equilibrium but quantal response equilibria do not.
On the other hand, from the point of evolution, a simple idea is to choose the equi-
librium with the largest basin of attraction (for the replicator dynamics or some other
deterministic evolutionary dynamics). This implies that a population with uncertain
initial state is more likely to evolve to the dominant equilibrium in the long run. For
symmetric 2× 2 games, the risk dominant equilibrium has the largest basin of attraction,
but this is not true for more general situations.
The object of the thesis is to study these equilibrium selection methods for certain
classes of games and compare to what extent these selection methods lead to similar or
diﬀerent results. The thesis consist of ﬁve chapters. Chapter 1 describes a theoretical
framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the graph of the quantal response equi-
librium (QRE) correspondence. Chapter 2 analyzes the quantal response methods for
equilibrium selection in detail for 2× 2 bimatrix games. Chapter 3 investigates the ulti-
matum game by a learning-mutation process related to the quantal response equilibrium.
Chapter 4 studies two equilibrium selection methods based on the replicator dynamics.
Chapter 5 provides an economic experiment which is a follow-up on a theoretical paper
by Sigmund et al. (2010). Figure 1 summarizes the interactions among the chapters.
Chapters 1-4 are written under the guidance of Prof. Josef Hofbauer. Chapter 5 is a
joint work with Cong Li, Dr. Hannelore De Silva, Peter Bednarik and Prof. Karl Sigmund.
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Figure 1: The main interactions between the chapters. The colors of the boxes indicates
the category of equilibrium selection models appeared in the chapters: Red means learning
approach, blue means evolutionary approach and black means a combination of learning
and evolution. A solid arrow connecting two boxes indicates that one chapter depends on
the other. A dash line connecting two boxes indicates that two chapters studies the same
class of games.
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Chapter 1
Quantal response methods for
equilibrium selection: Normal form
games
Abstract
This chapter describes a theoretical framework for equilibrium selection by tracing the
graph of the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) correspondence as a function of the
estimation error. If a quantal response function satisﬁes C2 continuity, monotonicity and
cumulativity, the graph of QRE correspondence generically includes a unique branch that
starts at the centroid of the strategy simplex and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium
as noises vanish. This equilibrium is called the limiting QRE of the game. We show
that the limiting QRE of a symmetric game must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and
provide a suﬃcient condition for the limiting QRE in two-person symmetric games.
Key words
Quantal response equilibrium; equilibrium selection; symmetric game; role game
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1.1 Introduction
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) was introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)
in the context of bounded rationality. In a QRE, players do not always choose best
responses. Instead, they make decisions based on a probabilistic choice model (called
the quantal response or the perturbed best response) and assume other players do so as
well. A general interpretation of this model is that players observe random perturbations
on the payoﬀs of strategies and choose optimally according to those noisy observations
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998; Goeree et al., 2005; Turocy, 2005; Sandholm, 2010).
For a given error structure, QRE is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of this process. 1
The most common speciﬁcation of QRE is the logit equilibrium, where the noises
follow the extreme value distribution (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1976; Blume, 1993, 1995;
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004; Turocy, 2005; Hofbauer and
Sandholm, 2002, 2007; Sandholm, 2010). The logistic response function has one free
parameter λ, whose inverse 1
λ
has been interpreted as the temperature, or the intensity
of noise. At λ = 0, players have no information about the game and each strategy is
chosen with equal probability. As λ approaches inﬁnity, players achieve full information
about the game and choose the best responses. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) then deﬁned
an equilibrium selection from the set of Nash equilibria by ”tracing” the branch of the
logit equilibrium correspondence starting at the centroid of the strategy simplex (the only
QRE when λ = 0) and continuing for larger and larger values of λ. For almost all normal
form games, this branch converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as λ goes to inﬁnity.
This Nash equilibrium is called the limiting logit equilibrium (LLE) of the game. Later,
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) extended the original notion of QRE to extensive-form
games (AQRE), and they found that the logit-AQRE also implies a unique selection from
the set of sequential equilibria in generic extensive form games.
QRE allows every strategy to be played with non-zero probability, therefore can be
applied to explain data from laboratory experiments which Nash equilibrium analysis
can not. In McKelvey and Palfrey’s original paper (1995), they analyzed data from
four past experiments on two-person normal form games, where participants displayed
non-equilibrium behaviors that are anomalous with respect to standard game theory. 2
1The model is equivalent to an incomplete information game where the actual payoﬀ is the sum of
payoﬀs of some ﬁxed game and independent random terms, and each players private signal is his own
payoﬀs. A QRE is a probability distribution of action proﬁles in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Ui,
2006). Ui (2002) also provided an evolutionary interpretation for QRE. In an n-population game, if a
stochastic best response process satisﬁes the detailed balance condition then the support of the stationary
distribution converges to the set of quantal response equilibria as the population size goes to inﬁnity.
2These experiments include 3 by 3 zero sum game (Lieberman, 1960), 4 by 4 zero sum game (O’Neill,
1987), 5 by 5 zero sum game (Rapoport and Boebel, 1992) and other bimatrix games with unique mixed
equilibria (Ochs, 1993).
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For each experiment, they compared subjects’ choices period by period with the logit
equilibrium and calculated the maximum likelihood estimate of the noise parameter λ.
They found that the QRE model is surprisingly successful in ﬁtting the data. Subsequent
studies include auctions (Anderson et al., 1998; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998; Goeree
et al., 2002), bargaining (Goeree and Holt, 2000; Yi, 2005), social dilemmas (Capra
et al., 1999; Goeree and Holt, 2001), coordination games (Anderson et al., 2001) and
games with network structures (Choi et al., 2009). In these experiments, estimates of λ
usually increased as the game progresses. 3 This then provides an empirical evidence of
the equilibrium selection above. As players gain experience from repeated observations,
they can be expected to make more precise estimates of the expected payoﬀs of diﬀerent
strategies.
Formally, a quantal response function maps the vector of expected payoﬀs into a vector
of choice probabilities. Haile et al. (2008) pointed out that without further restrictions
on the error structures, QRE can be constructed to match any choice probabilities in
any normal form game. Therefore, sensible empirical assumptions on the distributions
of payoﬀ perturbations are necessary. Haile et al. (2008) then suggested two promising
restrictions: exchangeability and invariance. Responding to an earlier draft of this pa-
per (Haile et al., 2004), Goeree et al. (2005) proposed a ”reduced form” deﬁnition of
QRE. Rather than restricting payoﬀ disturbances explicitly, they deﬁne a regular QRE
by restricting quantal response functions to satisfy four axioms: continuity, interiority,
responsiveness, and monotonicity. They showed that exchangeability is a suﬃcient con-
dition for monotonicity and invariance is a suﬃcient condition for responsiveness. Hence,
payoﬀ perturbations that satisfy exchangeability and invariance generate regular QRE.
More generally, the reduced form approach does not require that quantal response func-
tions are derived from some underlying choice models of stochastic utility maximization,
therefore allows for a richer set of models for data estimation.
In this chapter, we describe a theoretical framework for equilibrium selection by quan-
tal response methods in normal form games. Following the logit equilibrium, deﬁne a
QRE at noise level λ as a ﬁxed point of quantal response functions where payoﬀs are
multiplied by the factor λ. The set of QRE can be viewed as a correspondence from λ
to the set of mixed strategy proﬁles. Similarly as Goeree et al. (2005), we impose three
restrictions on quantal response functions: C2 continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity.
Continuity is a technical property, and both monotonicity and cumulativity have signif-
icant economic content. Monotonicity is a weak form of rational choice, meaning that
strategies with higher expected payoﬀs are used more frequently. Cumulativity ensures
that players choose best responses as λ goes to inﬁnity. Intuitively, quantal response func-
tions that satisfy the three axioms are smooth generalizations of best response functions.
3Although there is a tendency for λ to increase with experience, estimates of λ from diﬀerent experi-
ments can vary signiﬁcantly. See the eﬀect of payoﬀ magnitude on λ in McKelvey et al., 2000.
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We show that for almost all normal form games, there is a unique equilibrium selection
by tracing the graph of the QRE correspondence. The selected Nash equilibrium is called
the limiting QRE of the game.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 deﬁnes QRE at noise level
λ and introduces some properties. Section 1.3 studies the topological structure of the
graph of QRE correspondence. If a quantal response function satisﬁes (C0) continuity,
monotonicity and cumulativity, the graph contains a component that connects the centroid
of the strategy simplex and a Nash equilibrium. If the quantal response function is further
C2 continuous, for almost all normal form games, this component is diﬀeomorphic to a
C1 segment, which implies a unique equilibrium selection. Section 1.4 indicates that the
limiting QRE of a symmetric game must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Section 1.5
provides a suﬃcient condition for the limiting QRE in two-person symmetric games and
compares the limiting QRE to other equilibrium notions. Section 1.6 shows that there is a
one-to-one mapping between the logit equilibria of a bimatrix game and the corresponding
symmetric role game.
1.2 Quantal response equilibrium
Consider an n-person normal-form game Γ = (N,S, u), where N = {1, ..., n} is the set
of players. For each player i ∈ N , there is a strategy set Si = {si1, ..., siJi} consisting of
Ji pure strategies and a payoﬀ function, ui : S → R, where S =
∏
i∈N Si is the set of
strategy proﬁles.
Let Δi be the set of probability distributions on Si. Elements of Δi are of the form
pi : Si → R, where
∑
sij∈Si pi(sij) = 1 and pi(sij) ≥ 0 for all sij ∈ Si. For convenience, use
the notation pij = pi(sij). We write the set of mixed strategy proﬁles by Δ =
∏
i∈N Δi
and denote points in Δ by p = (p1, ..., pn). Therefore, given a mixed strategy proﬁle p,
player i’s expected payoﬀ is ui(p) =
∑
s∈S p(s)ui(s), where p(s) =
∏
i∈N pi(si), where
si ∈ Si denotes the ith element of s. For convenience, for each i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, ..., Ji},
denote by uij(p) the expected payoﬀ to player i adopting pure strategy sij when the
other players adopt their components of p. The space of payoﬀ vectors of player i’s pure
strategies is RJi , and write R
∑
Ji =
∏
i∈N R
Ji . Deﬁne the function u¯ : Δ → R∑ Ji by
u¯(p) = (u¯1(p), ..., u¯n(p)), where u¯i(p) = (ui1(p), ..., uiJi(p)).
It is assumed that for each pure strategy sij, there is an additional payoﬀ disturbance
εij, and we denote the noisy payoﬀ by
u˜ij(p) = uij(p) + εij (1.2.1)
Player i’s noise vector, εi = (εi1, ..., εiJi), is distributed according to a joint distribution
with density function fi(εi). f = (f1, ..., fn) is called admissible (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995; Goeree et al., 2005) if
CHAPTER 1. QRE: NORMAL FORM GAMES 15
(a) the marginal distribution of fi exists for each εij,
(b) disturbances are independent across players (not necessarily across strategies),
(c) E(εi) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Deﬁne Bij(u¯i) to be the set of εi such that strategy sij has the highest disturbed payoﬀ,
i.e.,
Bij(u¯i) = {εi ∈ RJi |uij + εij ≥ uik + εik, ∀k = 1, ..., Ji} (1.2.2)
Therefore, for given u¯i, player i selects sij with probability
σij(u¯i) =
∫
Bij(u¯i)
f(ε)dε (1.2.3)
σi : R
Ji → Δi deﬁned by Eq.(1.2.3) is called the structural quantal response function of
player i (Goeree et al., 2005). For any admissible f(ε) with a full support condition 4, σi
satisﬁes
(i) Interiority: σij(u¯i) > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., Ji} and u¯i ∈ RJi .
(ii) Continuity: σij(u¯i) is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function for all u¯i ∈ RJi .
(iii) Responsiveness:
∂σij(u¯i)
∂uij
> 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., Ji} and u¯i ∈ RJi .
If the payoﬀ disturbances are interchangeable 5, i.e., fi(εi1, ..., εiJi) = fi(εiψ(1), ..., εiψ(Ji))
for any permutation ψ, σi also satisﬁes
(iv) Monotonicity: uij > uik ⇒ σij(u¯i) > σik(u¯i) for all j, k ∈ {1, ..., Ji}.
On the other hand, any function σi : R
Ji → Δi that satisﬁes (i)-(iv) is called a regular
quantal response function of player i (Goeree et al., 2005). One well known example is
the logistic response function
σij(u¯i) =
eλuij∑Ji
k=1 e
λuik
(1.2.4)
where 1
λ
has been interpreted as the intensity of noises (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995;
Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002, 2007; Turocy, 2005). Eq.(1.2.4) arises from Eq.(1.2.3) if
all the noises follow the extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function
exp(− exp(−λεij−γ))), where γ is Euler’s constant. There are also many regular quantal
response functions that cannot be derived by the structural approach. For instance, see
Eq.(6.1), Eq.(6.2) and Proposition 6 in Goeree et al., 2005.
Following the logistic response function, consider the quantal response function as a
function of the noise level λ
σ¯ : R
∑
Ji × [0,+∞) → Δ (1.2.5)
4Full support condition says that f(ε) > 0 for any ε ∈ R
∑
Ji . Without full support, e.g., uniformly
distributed disturbances, the inequalities in (i) and (iii) hold only weakly (Goeree et al., 2005).
5A special case of interchangeable random variables is i.i.d.
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with σ¯(u¯, λ) = σ(λu¯), where λ = 0 means full noise and λ = +∞ means no noise (Goeree
et al., 2005). For convenience, we use the abusive notation σ to denote σ¯. For given
λ ≥ 0, a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is any p ∈ Δ such that for each i ∈ N and
j ∈ {1, ..., Ji},
pij = σij(λu¯i(p)) (1.2.6)
Denote the set of QRE at noise level λ by πλ = {p ∈ Δ|pij = σij(λu¯i(p))}.
In the rest of this section, we focus on the quantal response function Eq.(1.2.5) and
investigate the properties of πλ. Theorem 1.1 indicates that πλ is nonempty for any
continuous σ. If σ is Lipschitz continuous in a neighborhood of 0, Theorem 1.2 asserts
that for suﬃciently small λ, not only the existence but also the uniqueness of QRE can be
guaranteed. If σ is monotonic, Theorem 1.3 claims that π0 consists of only the centroid
of Δ when λ = 0. Finally, Theorem 1.4 says that QRE approach Nash equilibria of the
game when λ → +∞ if σ has cumulativity.
Theorem 1.1
If σ is continuous, there exists a QRE for any λ ≥ 0. 6
Proof
This result follows from Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, since σ ◦ u¯ is continuous. 
For given λ, Theorem 1.1 says that a QRE exists for any continuous random dis-
turbance, but the maximum number of QRE is unclear. Surprisingly, even for two-
person games, πλ may include inﬁnite number of QRE. Consider a 2 × 2 bimatrix game(
a1, b1 0, 0
0, 0 a2, b2
)
with (Lipschitz) continuous quantal response function
σi1(ui1, ui2, λ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ −12
1
2
+ λ(ui1 − ui2) −12 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ 12
1 1
2
≤ λ(ui1 − ui2)
(1.2.7)
For small λ such that |λ(ui1 − ui2)| ≤ 12 , QRE are the solutions of
p11 =
1
2
+ λ(b1p21 − b2(1− p21))
p21 =
1
2
+ λ(a1p11 − a2(1− p11)) (1.2.8)
6By applying Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) pointed out that a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a QRE is admissibility. Similar, Goeree et al. (2005) proved the existence
of a QRE for regular quantal response functions.
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Substituting p21 in the ﬁrst equation of Eq.(1.2.8) by the second equation and p11 in the
second equation of Eq.(1.2.8) by the ﬁrst equation,
p11(1− λ2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2)) = 1
2
+ λ
b1 + b2
2
− λb2 − λ2(b1 + b2)a2
p21(1− λ2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2)) = 1
2
+ λ
a1 + a2
2
− λa2 − λ2(a1 + a2)b2 (1.2.9)
Thus, for given λ > 0, if the payoﬀ matrix satisﬁes
λ2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2) = 1
1
2
+ λ
b1 + b2
2
= λb2 + λ
2(b1 + b2)a2
1
2
+ λ
a1 + a2
2
= λa2 + λ
2(a1 + a2)b2 (1.2.10)
any (p11, p21) ∈ Δ is a solution of Eq.(1.2.8). This implies that πλ = Δ. (See Example
1.1)
The quantal response function (1.2.7) is not regular, but one can easily regularize it
by adding small perturbations. In a similar way, it is possible to construct a quantal
response function such that πλ is countably inﬁnite.
Example 1.3
Consider a 2×2 bimatrix coordination game
(
1
3
, 2
3
0, 0
0, 0 2
3
, 1
3
)
with quantal response func-
tion (1.2.7). If 0 ≤ λ < 1, the game has a unique QRE, p11 = 2λ+36(λ+1) , p21 = 4λ+36(λ+1) . If λ > 1,
the game has three QRE, p11 = p21 = 0, p11 = p21 = 1 and p11 =
2λ+3
6(λ+1)
, p21 =
4λ+3
6(λ+1)
. If
λ = 1, from Eq.(1.2.10), any (p11, p21) ∈ Δ is a QRE. (See Figure 1.2.1)
Although the sets of QRE can be very complicated, next three theorems indicate that
πλ has good properties for limit cases λ → 0 and λ → +∞.
Theorem 1.2
If σ is Lipschitz continuous in a neighborhood Bδ(0) of 0, πλ is a singleton for suﬃ-
ciently small λ. 7
Proof
For given λ, deﬁne
σ ◦ u¯(p) = σ(λu¯(p)) (1.2.11)
7McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) proved this theorem for the logit equilibrium by the same technique. Ui
(2006) provided a suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of QRE in 2×2 symmetric games with Gaussian
noises.
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Figure 1.2.1: The graph of the QRE correspondence for Example 1.1.
From the deﬁnition of QRE, p ∈ πλ if and only if p is a ﬁxed point of σ ◦ u¯. We will show
that for suﬃciently small λ, σ ◦ u¯ has a unique ﬁxed point. Notice that σ is Lipschitz
continuous in Bδ(0) and uij(p) is smooth, there are S > 0 and T > 0 such that
‖σ ◦ u¯(p)− σ ◦ u¯(q)‖ = max
ij
|σij(λ¯u¯i(p))− σij(λ¯u¯i(q))|
≤ λ¯Smax
ij
|uij(p)− uij(q)| ≤ λ¯ST max
ij
|pij − qij| = λ¯ST‖p− q‖ (1.2.12)
for any p, q ∈ Δ, where ‖ · ‖ represents the sup norm, and λ¯ is picked to satisfy λ¯ST ≤ 1
and λ¯‖u¯(p)‖, λ¯‖u¯(q)‖ < δ for any p, q ∈ Δ. This implies that σ ◦ u¯ is a contraction
mapping for λ ≤ λ¯. From the Banach ﬁxed-point theorem, it has a unique ﬁxed point. 
Theorem 1.2 extends the existence of a QRE to the case where σ may not be (globally)
continuous. (See Example 1.2)
Example 1.2
Consider a 2 × 2 zero-sum game
(−1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 −2, 2
)
with discretely distributed noises
Pr(ε = −1) = Pr(ε = 1) = 1
2
. The quantal response function is written as
σi1(ui1, ui2, λ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ −1
1
2
−1 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ 1
1 1 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2)
(1.2.13)
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Figure 1.2.2: The graph of the QRE correspondence for Example 1.3.
It is easy to verify that the game has a unique QRE, p11 = p21 =
1
2
if λ < 2, but no QRE
if λ ≥ 2.
Notice that the diﬀerentiability in (ii) implies that σi is absolutely continuous for
each uij, it is natural to ask whether the Lipschitz continuity condition in Theorem 1.2
can be relaxed. However, Example 1.3 shows that it cannot be replaced by the absolute
continuity.
Example 1.3
Consider a 2× 2 symmetric game
(
1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
)
with the absolutely continuous quantal
response function
σi1(ui1, ui2, λ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ −1
1
2
−
√
−λ(ui1−ui2)
2
−1 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ 0
1
2
+
√
λ(ui1−ui2)
2
0 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2) ≤ 1
1 1 ≤ λ(ui1 − ui2)
(1.2.14)
For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, πλ includes three QRE, p11 = p21 = 1−λ2 , p11 = p21 = 12 and
p11 = p21 =
1+λ
2
. (See Figure 1.2.2)
Theorem 1.3
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If σ is monotonic, π0 consists of only the centroid of Δ, i.e., pij =
1
Ji
for all i ∈ N
and j ∈ {1, ..., Ji}.
Proof
Monotonicity and continuity implies that σij(0) = σik(0) for all i ∈ N and j, k ∈
{1, ..., Ji}. 
In particular, if σ is structural, monotonicity can be relaxed to interchangeability
(Goeree et al., 2005, Proposition 5).
Theorem 1.4a
Let pλ ∈ πλ. If σ is structural and lim
λ→+∞
pλ = p∗, p∗ must be a Nash equilibrium. 8
Proof
If p∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there are i ∈ N and j, k ∈ {1, ..., Ji} such that
p∗ij > 0 and uik(p
∗) > uij(p∗). Since u¯i is continuous, it follows that for suﬃciently
small 	, there is a Λ such that for λ > Λ, uik(p
λ) > uij(p
λ) + 	. As λ → +∞, we have
pλij = σij(λu¯i(p
λ)) ≤ ∫
λuij(pλ)+εij>λuik(pλ)+εik
f(ε)dε → 0. This contradicts p∗ij > 0. 
Theorem 1.4a says that the limit set of QRE as λ → +∞ includes a Nash equilibrium
for any structural quantal response function. 9 However, a surprising fact is that the
limit set may not contain any Nash equilibrium even if σ is regular. For instance, suppose
that σ is the logistic response function and deﬁne θi =
σi
2
+ 1
2Ji
for all i ∈ N . It is
obvious that θi is regular but θij >
1
2Ji
for all j ∈ {1, ..., Ji}. Therefore, if the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game has a component pij <
1
2Ji
, it can not be included in the limit
set. In order to provide a suﬃcient condition of Theorem 1.4a for non-structural quantal
response functions, we introduce a new property cumulativity (the name is borrowed from
the cumulative distribution function).
(v) Cumulativity: uij > uik ⇒ lim
λ→∞
σik(λu¯i)
σij(λu¯i)
= 0 for all i ∈ N and j, k ∈ {1, ..., Ji}.
The intuition is that strategies with lower payoﬀs will not be used as noises go to zero.
Theorem 1.4b
Let pλ ∈ πλ. If σ is cumulative and lim
λ→+∞
pλ = p∗, p∗ must be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof
If p∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there are i ∈ N and j, k ∈ {1, ..., Ji} such that
8McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) proved this theorem for the logit equilibrium.
9The limit set may not include all Nash equilibria of the game. For an example, see subsection 2.5.2
in Chapter 2.
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p∗ij > 0 and uik(p
∗) > uij(p∗). But from cumulativity and continuity, lim
λ→∞
σij(λu¯i(p
λ))
σik(λu¯i(pλ))
=
lim
λ→∞
σij(λu¯i(p
∗))
σik(λu¯i(p∗))
= 0. This contradicts p∗ij > 0. 
Notice that all structural quantal response functions are cumulative, Theorem 1.4a is
a special case of Theorem 1.4b.
1.3 Equilibrium selection in normal form games
In this section, we study a particular class of quantal response functions that satisfy
Theorems 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4b, i.e., σ : R
∑
Ji × [0,+∞) → Δ is continuous, monotonic and
cumulative. Our purpose is to deﬁne an equilibrium selection by ”tracing” the graph of
the QRE correspondence.
Denote the graph of the QRE correspondence by π = {(λ, p)|λ ≥ 0, p ∈ πλ}. Theorem
1.5 shows that for all normal form games, the QRE at λ = 0 is connected by a component
of π to at least one Nash equilibrium. If the quantal response function is C2 continuous,
Theorem 1.6 indicates that for almost all games, this component is diﬀeomorphic to a
C1 segment. This implies that the graph of the QRE correspondence contains a unique
branch which starts for λ = 0 at the centroid and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium
as λ goes to inﬁnity.
Theorem 1.5
π includes a component Tπ that connects the centroid and a Nash equilibrium.
10
Proof
Let us make the transformation λ = γ
1−γ and deﬁne the mapping
σ ◦ u¯ : Δ× [0, 1) → Δ (1.3.1)
with σ ◦ u¯(p, γ) = σ( γ
1−γ u¯(p)). For given γ, denote the set of QRE by π˜γ = {p|pij =
σij(
γ
1−γ u¯i(p))} and the graph of QRE by π˜. Clearly, (γ, p) ∈ π˜ if and only if σ( γ1−γ u¯(p)) =
p. From Browder’s Theorem (e.g., Mas-Colell, 1974, Theorem 1), for any given 0 < γ < 1,
there is a component T of π˜ such that T ∩Δ×{0} = ∅ and T ∩Δ×{γ} = ∅. For n ∈ N,
denote the component for γ = 1− 1
n
by Tn. By Mas-Colell (1990, Theorem A.5.1.(ii) page
10, see also Jean-Jacques Herings, 2002, Theorem 4.3), the closed limit of the sequence
Tn, denoted by Tπ, is compact and connected. From Theorem 1.4b, Tπ must include a
Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 1.6
10Jean-Jacques Herings (2002) proved this theorem for the logit equilibrium by the same technique.
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If σ is C2, for almost all games, π includes a unique branch that starts at the centroid
as λ = 0 and converges to a Nash equilibrium as λ → +∞. 11
Proof
Deﬁne
F (p, λ, u) = σ(λu¯(p))− p (1.3.2)
where u ∈ Rn∏ Ji denotes the payoﬀ matrix. For given u, write Fu(p, λ) = F (p, λ, u).
Clearly, (λ, p) ∈ π if and only if Fu(p, λ) = 0.
The Transversality Theorem (Mas-Colell, 1990, Proposition 8.3.1 page 320) says that
if F is C2 (the factor 2 comes from 1 + dim(λ)) and DF (p, λ, u) has rank
∑n
i=1 Ji − n
whenever F (p, λ, u) = 0, then for almost all u, DFu(p, λ) has rank
∑n
i=1 Ji − n whenever
Fu(p, λ) = 0. This implies that 0 is a regular value of Fu(p, λ) for almost all u.
We next calculate the rank of DF (p, λ, u).
DF (p, λ, u) = (
∂F
∂p
,
∂F
∂λ
,
∂F
∂u
)
= (
∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂p
− I, ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂λ
,
∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂u
)
= (−I, ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂λ
, 0)
+λ
∑
i∈N
Ji∑
j=1
(
∂σ(λu¯)
∂uij
∂uij
∂p
, 0,
∂σ(λu¯)
∂uij
∂uij
∂u
) (1.3.3)
where I is the (
∑n
i=1 Ji − n)× (
∑n
i=1 Ji − n) unit matrix.
We use the notation (sij, s−i) to represent the pure strategy proﬁle that player i
adopts the strategy sij and all other players adopt their component of s−i, where s−i =
(s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn) ∈
∏
j =i Sj = S−i. uij is then written as
uij =
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(sij, s−i)
∏
t=i
pt(st) (1.3.4)
Since pkJk = 1−
∑Jk−1
l=1 pkl,
∂uij
∂pkl
=
∑
sk=skl
ui(sij, s−i)
∏
t=i,k
pt(st)−
∑
sk=skJk
ui(sij, s−i)
∏
t =i,k
pt(st)
=
∑
sk=skl
ui(sij, s−i)
Jk∑
l′=1
∂uij
∂ui(skl′ , s−k)
−
∑
sk=skJk
ui(sij, s−i)
Jk∑
l′=1
∂uij
∂ui(skl′ , s−k)
(1.3.5)
11McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) proved this theorem for the logit equilibrium by applying Sard’s The-
orem.
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This implies that ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂pij
is a linear combination of columns of ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂u
. Hence, rank
DF (p, λ, u) = rank (−I, ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂λ
, ∂σ(λu¯(p))
∂u
) =
∑n
i=1 Ji − n.
Applying the Transversality Theorem, for almost all u, 0 is a regular value of Fu(p, λ).
F−1u (0) is then a C
1 one-dimensional manifold, which is diﬀeomorphic to a segment or a
circle (Milnor, 1965, Lemma 4; Mas-Colell, 1974, Theorem 2). From Theorem 1.2 and
Theorem 1.5, it is a segment that starts from the centroid as λ = 0 and converges to a
Nash equilibrium as λ → +∞. 
Theorem 1.6 implies that for almost all normal form games, we can deﬁne a unique
selection from the set of Nash equilibria by ”tracing” the graph of the QRE correspondence
beginning at the centroid of the strategy simplex (from Theorem 1.3, it is the unique
solution when λ = 0) and continuing for larger and larger values of λ. 12 For given σ, we
call the selected Nash equilibrium the limiting QRE of the game.
1.4 Equilibrium selection in symmetric games
This section studies the limiting QRE in n-person symmetric games. Theorem 1.7 points
out that the limiting QRE of a symmetric game must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
A normal form game is called symmetric if the players have identical strategy sets and
payoﬀ functions. That is, Si = Sj for all i, j ∈ N and ui(s1, ..., sn) = uψ(i)(sψ(1), ..., sψ(n))
for any permutation ψ and s ∈ S (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). Denote an n-person
symmetric game by (N, Sˆ, uˆ). For each player i ∈ N , Sˆ = {sˆ1, ..., sˆJ} is the strategy set
and uˆ : Sˆ×J → R is the payoﬀ function. Elements of J are of the form qˆ : Sˆn−1 → NJ0 ,
where
∑J
k=1 qˆk(s
n−1) = n− 1. Intuitively, qˆk calculates the number of pure strategy sˆk in
the strategy proﬁles sn−1. Therefore, payoﬀ to a player using pure strategy sˆi when the
others adopt sn−1 is uˆ(sˆi, qˆ(sn−1)).
Following the notations in section 1.2, uij(p) =
∑
si=sˆj
∏
k =i pk(sk)uˆ(sˆj, qˆ(s−i)), where
s−i ∈ Sˆn−1. QRE at noise level λ are the solutions of
pij = σij(λu¯i(p)) (1.4.1)
Suppose that players have the identical quantal response function, i.e., σij(λiu¯i) = σkj(λku¯k)
if λiu¯i = λku¯k for all i, k ∈ N and j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Denote it by σˆ : RJ × [0,+∞) → ΔJ ,
where ΔJ is the set of probability distributions on Sˆ. Eq.(1.4.1) is then written as
pij = σˆj(λu¯i(p)) (1.4.2)
12As pointed out by Turocy (2005), the branch may have turning points, leading to intervals on which
λ is decreasing while following the branch in the direction from the centroid at λ = 0 to the limiting
Nash equilibrium. For the logit equilibrium, there are at most a ﬁnite number of turning points (Turocy,
2005). However, following the idea in section 1.2, it is possible to construct a quantal response function
such that the branch has inﬁnite turning points.
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A QRE is called symmetric if pi = pj for all i, j ∈ N . We next show that all QRE on
Tπ (which is the component of π that connects the centroid and a Nash equilibrium) are
symmetric if Tπ is diﬀeomorphic to a segment. Consider the equation
pˆi = σˆi(λuˆ(pˆ)) (1.4.3)
where pˆ ∈ ΔJ , pˆi = pˆ(sˆi) and uˆj(pˆ) =
∑
sn−1∈Sˆn−1
∏n−1
k=1 pˆ(s
n−1
k )uˆ(sˆj, qˆ(s
n−1)). For any
given λ, it is easy to see that pˆ is a solution of Eq.(1.4.3) if and only if pi = pˆ for all
i ∈ N is a solution of Eq.(1.4.2). Denote the set of symmetric QRE at noise level λ by
πˆλ. Existence of a symmetric QRE follows from Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem. Deﬁne
the graph of symmetric QRE correspondence by πˆ = {(λ, p)|λ ≥ 0, p ∈ πˆλ}. Similarly as
Theorem 1.5, it is easy to prove that πˆ includes a component Tπˆ that connects the centroid
and a symmetric Nash equilibrium by applying Browder’s Theorem. Since πˆ ⊆ π, we have
Tπˆ ⊆ Tπ. Therefore, in the case that Tπ is a segment, Tπˆ must also be a segment and
Tπˆ = Tπ. All QRE on Tπ are then symmetric. As a consequence, we have Theorem 1.7.
Theorem 1.7
The limiting QRE of a symmetric game must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1.7 implies that if a symmetric game has a unique symmetric Nash equilib-
rium, the limiting QRE must be that equilibrium. However, the uniqueness of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium does not imply the existence of the limiting QRE (see Example 1.4).
Since the set of payoﬀ functions for n-person symmetric games has Lebesgue measure zero
in R
∑
J , the existence of the limiting QRE for almost all symmetric games is problematic.
In particular, Theorem 2.1 in Chapter 2 indicates that the limiting QRE does not exist
for any 2× 2 symmetric game with a unique interior symmetric Nash equilibrium. Thus,
the equilibrium selection is not well deﬁned for one fourth of all 2× 2 symmetric games.
Example 1.4
Consider a 2 × 2 symmetric game
(
0, 0 1, 1
1, 1 0, 0
)
with the logistic response function.
QRE are the solutions of
p11 =
1
1 + eλ(2p21−1)
p21 =
1
1 + eλ(2p11−1)
(1.4.4)
The game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium p11 = p21 =
1
2
and two asymmetric
Nash equilibria p11 = 1, p21 = 0 and p11 = 0, p21 = 1. For any given λ, this is a unique
symmetric QRE, p11 = p21 =
1
2
. However, the graph of QRE correspondence has a bifur-
cation point and tracing the branch beginning at the centroid could reach all three Nash
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Figure 1.4.1: The graph of the QRE correspondence for Example 1.4.
equilibria. (See Figure 1.4.1) Hence, the equilibrium selection is not well deﬁned.
Since asymmetric Nash equilibria cannot be the limiting QRE in symmetric games, we
restrict the ”tracing process” to the graph of symmetric QRE correspondence πˆ. Redeﬁne
the limiting QRE in symmetric games as the unique limiting point of Tπˆ instead of Tπ.
Similarly as Theorem 1.6, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1.8
If σˆ is C2, for almost all symmetric games, πˆ contains a unique branch that starts at
the centroid as λ = 0 and converges to a symmetric Nash equilibrium as λ → +∞.
Under the new deﬁnition, the limiting QRE exists for almost all symmetric games.
Moreover, if a symmetric game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, it is the limiting
QRE no matter how many asymmetric Nash equilibria the game has. As a consequence,
following two corollaries can be obtained directly.
Corollary 1.1
If a two-person symmetric game has an interior ESS, it is the limiting QRE. 13
13This follows from the fact that if a symmetric game has an interior ESS, then it is the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
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Corollary 1.2
The limiting QRE of an anti-coordination game is the interior Nash equilibrium. 14
1.5 Two-person symmetric games
Consider a J × J two-person symmetric game. Let aij denotes the payoﬀ to a player
using strategy sˆi when he meets strategy sˆj. Theorem 1.8 guarantees the existence of the
limiting QRE for almost all two-person symmetric games. In order to decide the limiting
QRE, we introduce a new concept.
Deﬁnition 1.1
A pure strategy sˆi pairwise payoﬀ dominates (PPD) another pure strategy sˆj if∑
k∈Jij aik >
∑
k∈Jij ajk for any {i, j} ⊆ Jij ⊆ {1, ..., J}. If sˆi PPD sˆj for any sˆj ∈ Sˆ
and Jij, sˆi is globally pairwise payoﬀ dominant (GPPD).
Theorem 1.9
Suppose that σ is continuous, monotonic and cumulative. In two-person symmetric
games, the limiting QRE is the GPPD Nash equilibrium if it exists.
Proof
Suppose that sˆi is the GPPD Nash equilibrium. From Deﬁnition 1.1, uˆi(pˆ) > uˆj(pˆ)
in region {pˆ ∈ ΔJ |pˆi = pˆj ≥ pˆk, ∀k = i, j} for any j = i. Since uˆ and σ are continuous,
it follows for suﬃciently small λ, uˆi(pˆ) > uˆj(pˆ) for any j = i and pˆ ∈ πˆλ. If σ has
monotonicity and cumulativity, QRE correspondence starting at the centroid will enter
region ΔJimax = {pˆ ∈ ΔJ |pˆi = max{pˆ1, ..., pˆJ}} and can not escape from it. Therefore, the
QRE correspondence must converge to a Nash equilibrium in ΔJimax.
To complete the proof, it is enough to show that pˆi = 1 is the only Nash equilibrium in
this region. For any pˆ ∈ ΔJimax, where pˆi < 1, suppose that max{pˆ1, ..., pˆi−1, pˆi+1, ..., pˆJ} =
pˆj > 0. From Deﬁnition 1.1, uˆi(pˆ) > uˆj(pˆ), which implies that it can not be a Nash equi-
librium. As a consequence, pˆi = 1 is the limiting QRE. 
We next compare the limiting QRE to the solution concept of 1
2
dominant equilib-
rium (Morris et al., 1995). A pure strategy proﬁle (sˆi, sˆi) is called
1
2
dominant if for
any pˆ ∈ ΔJ with pˆi ≥ 12 , br(pˆ) = {sˆi}. 12 dominant equilibrium is the suﬃcient condi-
tion for many equilibrium selection methods (see a literature review by Honda, 2012),
14A two-person symmetric game is said to have the anti-coordination property if any worst response to
a mixed strategy is in the support of that mixed strategy. One famous example is the Hawk-Dove game.
Kojima and Takahashi (2007) showed that every anti-coordination game has a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium. The equilibrium is in the interior of Δ.
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Figure 1.5.1: Best response regions for Example 1.5
e.g., the evolutionary methods (e.g., Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993), the potential
game method (Monderer and Shapley, 1996), the global game method (Carlsson and van
Damme, 1993), the incomplete information method (Kajii and Morris, 1997), the perfect
foresight dynamics method (Matsui and Matsuyama, 1995), spatially dominance method
(Hofbauer et al., 1997; Hofbauer, 1999).
From the deﬁnitions, a game has at most one GPPD Nash equilibrium and has at
most one 1
2
dominant equilibrium. If both exist, then two equilibrium must be the same.
To show this, suppose that sˆi is GPPD and sˆj is
1
2
dominant, where i = j. GPPD implies
aii + aij > aji + ajj but
1
2
dominance implies
aii+aij
2
<
aji+ajj
2
. Here is a contradiction.
At a ﬁrst glance, GPPD is more or less stronger than 1
2
dominant since the GPPD
Nash equilibrium strategy is the unique best response to the centroid of the strategy
simplex. However, this intuition is wrong (see Example 1.5). Theorem 1.10 claims that
the GPPD strategy is 1
2
dominant if the symmetric game is a coordination game.
Example 1.5
Consider the following 3× 3 symmetric game
⎛
⎝2 4 00 0 5
0 0 0
⎞
⎠ . Best response regions are
shown in Figure 1.5.1. The ﬁrst strategy is GPPD dominant but is not 1
2
dominant. For
instance, the second strategy is the best response to the strategy proﬁle (1
2
, 0, 1
2
).
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Theorem 1.10
Suppose that the two-person symmetric game is a coordination game, i.e., aii > aji for
j = i. sˆi is the GPPD Nash equilibrium if and only if for any pˆ ∈ ΔJimax, br(pˆ) = {sˆi}.
Proof
Without loss of generality, suppose that s1 is the GPPD Nash equilibrium and pˆ1 ≥
pˆ2 ≥ ... ≥ pˆJ . For any i ∈ {2, ..., J},
uˆ1(pˆ)− uˆi(pˆ) =
J−1∑
j=1
(pˆj − pˆj+1)
j∑
k=1
(a1k − aik) + pˆJ
J∑
k=1
(a1k − aik) (1.5.1)
From Deﬁnition 1.1,
∑j
k=1 a1k >
∑j
k=1 aik for i ≤ j and
∑j
k=1 a1k + a1i >
∑j
k=1 aik + aii
for i > j. Notice that aii > a1i, we have
∑j
k=1 a1k >
∑j
k=1 aik for any i, j ∈ {2, ..., J}.
This implies uˆ1(pˆ)− uˆi(pˆ) > 0, i.e., br(pˆ) = {sˆi}.
On the other hand, suppose that for any pˆ ∈ ΔJimax, br(pˆ) = {sˆi}. In this case, for
any given j = i and {i, j} ⊆ Jij ⊆ {1, ..., J}, we take pˆ with pˆk = pˆi for all k ∈ Jij and
pˆk = 0 for others. Since pˆ ∈ ΔJimax,
∑
k∈Jij aik =
uˆi(pˆ)
pˆi
>
uˆj(pˆ)
pˆi
=
∑
k∈Jij ajk. This implies
that sˆi is GPPD. 
From Theorem 1.10, GPPD Nash equilibrium strategy is the unique best response if it
is the most frequent strategy in opponent’s strategy proﬁle, therefore must be 1
2
dominant.
In particular, the two conditions are equivalent in 2 × 2 coordination games. In 3 × 3
coordination games, GPPD dominant is stronger. A strategy is GPPD if and only if it
is 1
2
dominant and it is the unique best response to the centroid of the strategy simplex.
Example 1.6 gives a 3 × 3 symmetric game, where the 1
2
dominant equilibrium and the
limiting QRE are diﬀerent.
Example 1.6
Consider the following 3 × 3 symmetric coordination game
⎛
⎝6 0 20 5 3
2 3 4
⎞
⎠ . The ﬁrst
strategy is 1
2
dominant and the third strategy is the best response to the centroid. Best
response regions are shown in Figure 1.5.2. However, Gambit (McKelvey et al., 2010)
suggests that the limiting logit equilibrium is the second strategy. (See Figure 1.5.2)
From Deﬁnition 1.1, a GPPD Nash equilibrium is also GPPD in the reduced form of the
original game obtained by eliminating strictly dominated strategies. A natural question
is to ask whether the limiting QRE depends only on the reduced form game. However,
the answer is no. Goeree and Holt (2001) provided an example that the limiting logit
equilibrium is subject to framing eﬀects, i.e., duplicating a non Nash equilibrium strategy
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BR=3BR=2
BR=1
1
2 3
Figure 1.5.2: Best response regions and the QRE correspondence (red curve) for Example
1.6. Strategy 1 is 1
2
dominant and strategy 3 is the best response to the centroid. However,
strategy 2 is the limiting QRE.
which is never selected may aﬀect the equilibrium selection (see also Goeree and Holt,
2004). More generally, Hilbe (2011) indicated that any diﬀerentiable quantal response
function exhibits the framing eﬀects. Here, we prove a much stronger result.
Theorem 1.11
Suppose that σ is continuous, monotonic and cumulative. In two-person symmetric
games, any strict (symmetric) Nash equilibrium can be selected as the limiting QRE by
appropriately adding a single strictly dominated strategy.
Proof
Without loss of generality, suppose that aij > 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., J} and the pure
strategy proﬁle (sˆJ , sˆJ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. We add a new strategy sˆJ+1, where
aiJ+1 = aJ+1i = 0 for i ∈ {1, ..., J − 1}, aJ+1J = max{a1J , ..., aJ−1J} and aJJ+1 >
aJ+1J+1 >
∑J−1
i=1
∑J−1
j=1 aij. Clearly, sJ+1 is strictly dominated by sJ . (See Example 1.7)
For any pˆ ∈ {pˆ ∈ ΔJ+1|pˆJ+1 ≥ max{pˆ1, ..., pˆJ−1}} and any k ∈ {1, ..., J − 1}
uˆJ(pˆ) > uˆJ+1(pˆ) > pˆJaJ+1J + pˆJ+1
J−1∑
i=1
J−1∑
j=1
aij ≥ pˆJakJ +
J−1∑
i=1
pˆiaki = uˆk(pˆ) (1.5.2)
If σ is continuous, monotonic and cumulative, the QRE correspondence starting at the
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BR=2
BR=1
1
2 3
Figure 1.5.3: Best response regions and the QRE correspondence (red curve) for Example
1.7. The dash line denotes pˆ1 = pˆ3. The QRE correspondence starting at the centroid
can not escape from {pˆ ∈ Δ3|pˆ3 ≥ pˆ1}.
centroid will enter and can not escape from {pˆ ∈ ΔJ+1|pˆJ+1 ≥ max{pˆ1, ..., pˆJ−1}}. There-
fore, the QRE correspondence must converge to the only Nash equilibrium, pˆJ = 1, in the
region. 
Theorem 1.11 says that the limiting QRE of a game with strictly dominated strategies
may be very diﬀerent from that of the reduced form game. In fact, eliminating a strategy
which is strictly dominated by the limiting QRE strategy may change the outcome of
the equilibrium selection (see Example 1.7). The limiting QRE is highly sensitive to the
addition and elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Example 1.7
Consider the following 2×2 symmetric coordination game
(
5 2
1 4
)
. The ﬁrst strategy
is the limiting QRE since it is 1
2
dominant. We now add a strictly dominated strategy
such that the second strategy is selected. From the proof of Theorem 1.11, an appropriate
payoﬀ matrix is
⎛
⎝5 2 01 4 7
0 2 6
⎞
⎠ , where the third strategy is strictly dominated by the second
strategy. Best response regions are shown in Figure 1.5.3. In the new game, Gambit
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suggests that the limiting logit equilibrium is the second strategy. (See Figure 1.5.3)
1.6 Role games
A role game is a two-person symmetric game based on a bimatrix game (Selten, 1980;
Gaunersdorfer et al., 1991; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Berger, 2002).
With the ﬁrst move, nature randomly decides which player is player 1 (role 1) and which
player is player 2 (role 2) in the later bimatrix game. After that, the two players play the
bimatrix game, called the base game, according to the roles they have been assigned.
In this section, we consider a variant of the standard version, where players play both
roles. 15 In detail, each player has to participate in two bimatrix games, where in one
game acts as role 1 and in the other game acts as role 2. This modiﬁcation does not
change Nash equilibria of the role game. In fact, we could multiply the payoﬀ matrix of
the standard role game by the factor 2 to get the variant payoﬀ values. We will see that
each logit equilibrium of the base game corresponds to a logit equilibrium of the (variant)
role game.
Let the base game be a J1 × J2 bimatrix game. Denote the payoﬀ to player i using
strategy sik when he meets player j using strategy sjl by aikl. Therefore, given a mixed
strategy proﬁle p ∈ Δ, uik(pj) =
∑Jj
l=1 pjlaikl.
The base game leads to a J1J2 × J1J2 symmetric role game. Denote a pure strategy
in the role game by sˆij, which means using strategy s1i in role 1 and using strategy s2j in
role 2. The payoﬀ to a player using strategy sˆij when he meets strategy sˆkl is then given
by a1il + a2jk. From the construction of the role game, each mixed strategy proﬁle of the
role game, pˆ ∈ ΔJ1J2 , naturally corresponds to a mixed strategy proﬁle of the bimatrix
game, p ∈ Δ, where p1i =
∑J2
l=1 pˆil and p2j =
∑J1
k=1 pˆkj. For given pˆ ∈ ΔJ1J2 , the average
payoﬀ of sˆij is then written as
uˆij(pˆ) =
J1∑
k=1
J2∑
l=1
pˆkl(a1il + a2jk) = u1i(p2) + u2j(p1) (1.6.1)
Logit equilibria of the J1 × J2 bimatrix game are the solutions of
p1i =
eλu1i(p2)∑J1
k=1 e
λu1k(p2)
p2j =
eλu2j(p1)∑J2
l=1 e
λu2l(p1)
(1.6.2)
15Sigmund et al. adopted this variant in their paper ”Reward and punishment” (2001), where the base
game is the mini ultimatum game and the role game is the mini public goods game with punishment.
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and in the corresponding J1J2 × J1J2 role game, logit equilibria are the solutions of
pˆij =
eλuˆij(pˆ)∑J1
k=1
∑J2
l=1 e
λuˆkl(pˆ)
(1.6.3)
Notice that eλuˆij(pˆ) = eλu1i(p2)eλu2j(p1), there is a one-to-one mapping between the logit
equilibria of the bimatrix game and the corresponding role game, where pˆij = p1ip2j,∑J2
l=1 pˆil = p1i and
∑J1
k=1 pˆkj = p2j. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium p is the LLE in a
bimatrix game if and only if the Nash equilibrium (pˆ, pˆ), where pˆij = p1ip2j, is the LLE
in the corresponding role game.
Furthermore, this result could be extended to any normal form game and its corre-
sponding role game. If the base game is an n-person normal form game (N,S, u), the
role game is an n-person
∏
i∈N Ji -strategy symmetric game, where each player plays n!
diﬀerent normal form games. 16 p ∈ πλ in the base game if and only if (pˆ, ..., pˆ) ∈ πˆλ
in the role game, where pˆi1...in =
∏n
j=1 pjij , ij ∈ {1, ..., J}. Therefore, the limiting logit
equilibrium in any normal form game can be predicted by the corresponding symmetric
role game.
However, this relation does not hold for more general quantal response functions. For
instance, consider the following simple regular quantal response function
σij =
1 + λuij
Ji + λ
∑Ji
k=1 uik
(1.6.4)
when payoﬀs are positive. It is easy to check that
J2∑
j=1
σˆij =
J2∑
j=1
1 + λ(u1i + u2j)
J1J2 + λ
∑J1
k=1
∑J2
l=1(u1k + u2l)
=
1 + λ(u1i + c)
J1 + λ
∑J1
k=1(u1k + c)
= 1 + λu1i
J1 + λ
∑J1
k=1 u1k
= σ1i (1.6.5)
if we take u2j = c > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., J2}.
1.7 Conclusion
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) pointed out that the graph of logit equilibrium correspon-
dence generically includes a unique branch connecting the centroid at λ = 0 to a unique
Nash equilibrium as λ goes to inﬁnity. They then suggested an equilibrium selection by
tracing this branch. In this chapter, we extend this idea to quantal response functions
16Since the base game has n roles, there are n! (the number of n-combinations) diﬀerent normal form
games.
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that satisfy three axioms: continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity. From Brouwer’s
ﬁxed point theorem, C0 continuity is enough to guarantee the existence of a QRE for
any given λ = 0. Monotonicity requires that players are ”better responders” that play
strategies with higher expected payoﬀs more often. As a result of monotonicity and con-
tinuity, the only QRE at λ = 0 is the centroid. Cumulativity ensures that players choose
best responses as λ goes to inﬁnity. Together with continuity, the QRE correspondence
converges to Nash equilibria as λ goes to inﬁnity. If a quantal response function satisﬁes
the three axioms, the graph of QRE correspondence includes a path that connects the
centroid at λ = 0 to at least one Nash equilibrium. However, C0 continuity is too weak
that the path is not necessarily nicely behaved. In exceptional cases, it may not be diﬀer-
entiable and bifurcation may arise. Such exceptional cases can be generically excluded by
making diﬀerentiability assumption. If the quantal response function is C2 continuous,
except for a nowhere dense set of games, the path is diﬀeomorphic to a C1 segment. This
implies that for almost all normal form games, there is a unique selection from the set
of Nash equilibria by ”tracing” the graph of the QRE correspondence beginning at the
centroid.
In the quantal response model, each player’s payoﬀs are computed based on beliefs
about other players’ strategies, and in a QRE, the beliefs match the choice probabilities.
In symmetric games with identical quantal response functions, the graph of QRE corre-
spondence always contains a symmetric path (players have identical beliefs on this path)
that connects the centroid to a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the limiting QRE
of a symmetric game must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium. If we further restrict the
tracing process to the graph of symmetric QRE correspondence, the limiting QRE exists
for almost all symmetric games. One implication directly from this result is that if a
symmetric game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, then it must be the limiting
QRE.
In two-person symmetric games, a suﬃcient condition for the limiting QRE is GPPD.
In coordination games, GPPD strategy is the unique best response when it is the most
frequent strategy in opponent’s strategy proﬁle. This deﬁnition is closely related to the p-
dominant equilibrium introduced by Morris et al. (1995), which says that each strategy of
the strategy pair is a best response if the other player taking his strategy with probability
at least p. In J × J coordination games, GPPD is stronger than 1
2
dominant but weaker
than 1
J
dominant.
It is well known that the QRE is subject to framing eﬀects: duplicating a strategy
aﬀects the equilibrium selection (Goeree and Holt, 2001, 2004). Such framing eﬀects are
inevitable if quantal response functions are diﬀerentiable (Hilbe, 2011). We oﬀer a much
stronger proposition: By appropriately adding a single strictly dominated strategy, any
strict (symmetric) Nash equilibrium can be selected. Therefore, the limiting QRE is highly
CHAPTER 1. QRE: NORMAL FORM GAMES 34
sensitive to the addition and elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 17 However, this
does not imply that quantal response methods are without empirical content. Conversely,
it is actually consistent with many experimental results. For instance, Cooper et al. (1990)
provided evidence that strictly dominated strategies may inﬂuence equilibrium selection
even though they are never selected as an outcome.
In this chapter, payoﬀ functions are assumed to be linearly dependent on the noise
factor λ. Previous results could be extended to more general cases if σij(u¯i, λ) =
1
Ji
for
all i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, ..., Ji} when λ = 0. 18 For instance, consider the following regular
quantal response function introduced by Luce (1959, see also Eq.(6.1) in Goeree et al.,
2005) when payoﬀs are positive
σij(u¯i, λ) =
(uij)
λ∑Ji
k=1(uik)
λ
(1.7.1)
It is easy to verify that continuity, monotonicity and cumulativity are satisﬁed, and the
only QRE at λ = 0 is the centroid. Therefore, Eq.(1.7.1) yields a unique equilibrium
selection for almost all games.
Finally, we show that there is a one-to-one mapping between the logit equilibria of a
normal form game and the corresponding (variant) role game. Intuitively, QRE in the
base game are the projection of QRE in the role game. Therefore, the limiting logit
equilibrium in any normal form game can be predicted by the symmetric role game. In
particular, if the base game is a 2×2 zero-sum game with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium
p, the set of Nash equilibria in the role game is a continuum, where pˆ11 + pˆ12 = p11 and
pˆ11 + pˆ21 = p21. Since the two games have the identical limiting QRE, logit equilibrium
correspondence in the role game converges to the Wright equilibrium. 19 As pointed out
by Berger (2002), this equilibrium is global attractive under the best response dynamics.
Thus, the best response dynamics and the quantal response method select the same Nash
equilibrium.
17Kim and Wong (2010) showed that for any symmetric normal form game, any strict (symmetric) Nash
equilibrium can be selected as the unique long-run equilibrium (Kandori et al., 1993) by appropriately
adding a single strategy which is strictly dominated by all original strategies.
18In this case, cumulativity is redeﬁned as: uij > uik ⇒ lim
λ→∞
σik(u¯i,λ)
σij(u¯i,λ)
= 0.
19In the well known two-locus, two-alleles equation from populations genetics, the surface pˆ11pˆ22 =
pˆ12pˆ21 is called the Wright manifold. Berger (2002) then called the Nash equilibrium in this manifold the
Wright equilibrium.
Chapter 2
Quantal response methods for
equilibrium selection: 2× 2 bimatrix
games
Abstract
In this chapter, quantal response methods for equilibrium selection are analyzed in detail
for 2 × 2 bimatrix coordination games. We show that in general not the risk-dominant
equilibrium is selected. In the logarithmic game, the limiting QRE is the Nash equilibrium
with the larger sum of square root payoﬀ. Finally, we apply the quantal response methods
to the public goods game with punishment. A cooperative equilibrium can be selected if
punishment is strong enough.
Key words
Quantal response equilibrium; logit equilibrium; logrithmic game; equilibrium selection;
punishment
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2.1 Introduction
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) has
been widely used to explain experimental data. In some applications, a limiting logit
equilibrium, the limit of logit equilibrium as the noise approaches zero, is compared with
limiting behavior in experiments (Anderson et al., 2001; Yi, 2002, 2005; Breitmoser et al.,
2010). In contrast, few papers investigated the limiting QRE analytically. In particular,
from our knowledge, the only theoretical work on equilibrium selection in normal form
games is done by Turocy (2005). However, his claim that the QRE methods always select
the risk dominant equilibrium, is wrong. 1
In this chapter, we analyze the limiting QRE in 2×2 bimatrix games in detail. Section
2.2 deﬁnes logit equilibrium and reviews some basic results. Section 2.3 derives a formula
for the quantal response equilibrium selection in 2×2 coordination games. Section 2.4 tests
this formula with six diﬀerent types of quantal response functions. For the logarithmic
game (Harsanyi, 1973), we get a simple square root rule for the equilibrium selection.
Finally, section 2.5 applies these results to the public goods game (PGG) with punishment.
We compare the theoretical prediction with the past empirical studies qualitatively and
hope to explain how punishment works in the real world.
2.2 Logit equilibrium
Let us start from a 2×2 bimatrix game, where A1 and A2 are two pure strategies of player
A, and B1 and B2 are two pure strategies of player B. Suppose that aij denotes the payoﬀ
to player A using strategy Ai when it meets strategy Bj and bij the payoﬀ to player B
using strategy Bi when it meets strategy Aj. The bimatrix game is called a coordination
game if pure strategy pairs (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) are both strict Nash equilibria. In this
case, the payoﬀ matrix can be normalized 2 as
B1 B2
A1
A2
(
1− q, c(1− p) 0, 0
0, 0 q, cp
)
(2.2.1)
where p = b22−b12
b11+b22−b21−b12 , q =
a22−a12
a11+a22−a21−a12 , c =
b11+b22−b21−b12
a11+a22−a21−a12 , and these parameters
satisfy 0 < p, q < 1, and c > 0. Besides of two strict pure Nash equilibria, the coordination
game also has a mixed equilibrium (p, q).
1In 2× 2 symmetric coordination games, the limiting QRE is the risk dominant equilibrium since the
risk dominant equilibrium is 12 dominant (See Theorems 1.10 and 1.11 in Chapter 1). But this statement
is not true for 2× 2 bimatrix coordination games.
2As pointed out by Goeree et al.(2005), structural quantal response functions involve only payoﬀ
diﬀerences.
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In the framework of best response, players choose the strategy with the highest payoﬀ.
Denote the probability of player A using strategy A1 by x and the probability of player
B using strategy B1 by y. One can easily show that A1 is the best response strategy of
player A if and only if y > q and B1 is the best response strategy of player B if and only
if x > p.
Following McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), in a QRE, players are assumed boundedly
rational and obverse noisy evaluations of the strategies values. In the 2×2 bimatrix game,
player i will choose the ﬁrst strategy if and only if
ui1 + εi1 > ui2 + εi2 (2.2.2)
where uij denotes the payoﬀ of player i using strategy j and εij is the payoﬀ disturbance.
Best response function becomes probabilistic rather than deterministic. Suppose that
player i’s noise vector, εi = (εi1, εi2), is distributed according to a joint distribution with
density function pi(εi), player i then adopts the ﬁrst strategy with probability
σi1(ui1, ui2) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ui1−ui2+εi1
−∞
pi(εi)dεi2dεi1 (2.2.3)
where σij(ui1, ui2) is called the quantal response function.
The most common speciﬁcation of QRE is the logit equilibrium. For any given λ ≥ 0,
the logistic quantal response function is given by
σi1(ui1, ui2) =
eλui1
eλui1 + eλui2
=
1
1 + eλ(ui2−ui1)
. (2.2.4)
This arises from (2.2.3) if all the noises follow the extreme value distribution with cumu-
lative distribution function exp(− exp(−λε− γ)), where γ is Euler’s constant. Therefore,
if each player uses a logistic quantal response function, the corresponding logit equilibria
are the solutions of
x =
1
1 + eλ(q−y)
y =
1
1 + eλc(p−x)
(2.2.5)
Consider the logit equilibria as a function of λ. λ = 0 means full noise and λ = +∞
means no noise. For the set of logit equilibria, it is obvious that when λ = 0, Eq.(2.2.5)
has a unique solution (1
2
, 1
2
). On the other hand, when λ → +∞, the set of logit equilibria
approaches the set of all three Nash equilibria of the game.
As shown by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), for almost all normal form games, the
graph of the logit equilibria correspondence contains a unique branch which starts for
λ = 0 at the centroid of the strategy simplex and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium
as λ goes to inﬁnity. This deﬁnes a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria by
”tracing” the graph of the logit equilibria correspondence. The selected Nash equilibrium
is called the limiting logit equilibrium of the game.
CHAPTER 2. QRE: BIMATRIX GAMES 38
2.3 Equilibrium selection
In this section, we study the equilibrium selection by the structural QRE (Goeree et
al., 2005), where the quantal response function is deﬁned in Eq.(2.2.3). Notice that
σij(ui1, ui2) depends only on the payoﬀ diﬀerence ui = ui1 − ui2, we write σi(ui) the
probability of player i choosing the ﬁrst strategy with payoﬀ diﬀerence ui. The density
function pi is called admissible if it is continuous, unbiased and independent across play-
ers (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). From Proposition 2 in Goeree et al., 2005, if pi is
admissible, σi(ui) satisﬁes:
(a) continuous,
(b) monotonically increasing in ui,
(c) σi(ui) = 1− σi(−ui).
That is, σi(ui) is a cumulative density function of a symmetric distribution. For conve-
nience, suppose that the disturbance on each player is identically distributed and follows
a unimodal distribution. In this case, players have the same quantal response function,
σ = σ1 = σ2, and σ(u) is the cumulative distribution function of a unimodal symmetric
distribution, where σ′(0) > 0, σ′′(u) ≥ 0 for u < 0 and σ′′(u) ≤ 0 for u > 0. The explicit
formula of σ of course depends on the density function and we will investigate diﬀerent
types of noises in the next section.
Following the logit equilibrium, let us introduce the level of noise λ (λ ≥ 0) into the
structural QRE and write the quantal response function at level λ by σ(λu). λ = 0 means
full noise and λ = +∞ means no noise. For the 2×2 bimatrix game (2.2.1), QRE at level
λ are the solutions of
x = σ(λ(y − q))
y = σ(λc(x− p)) (2.3.1)
As pointed out by Goeree et al. (2005), there exists a structure QRE of the game (2.2.1) for
any admissible pi. Let us now regard the solution of Eq.(2.3.1) as a 3-dimensional vector
(x, y, λ), where (x, y) is the QRE at noise level λ. When λ = 0, Eq.(2.3.1) has a unique
solution (1
2
, 1
2
, 0). When λ = +∞, Eq.(2.3.1) has three solutions, (0, 0,+∞), (1, 1,+∞)
and (p, q,+∞), which correspond to the three Nash equilibria of the coordination game.
Similarly as the logit equilibrium, Eq.(2.3.1) induces a continuous path (x, y, λ) starting
from the center point and to one of the Nash equilibria for almost all games (Theorem
1.6 in Chapter 1). This then deﬁnes a unique equilibrium selection. For given σ, we call
the selected Nash equilibrium the limiting QRE of the game (2.2.1).
Theorem 2.1
(a) For c = 1, the limiting QRE is (1, 1) if p + q < 1, and is (0, 0) if p + q > 1. (b)
For c = 0, the limiting QRE is (1, 1) if p + q < 1 and cp + q < 1
2
+ c
2
, and is (0, 0) if
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p+ q > 1 and cp+ q > 1
2
+ c
2
. 3
Proof:
The intersecting points of the QRE correspondence and the plane x+ y = 1 satisfy
σ(λ(y − q)) + σ(λc(x− p)) = 1 (2.3.2)
Since σ is the cumulative distribution function of a symmetric distribution, λ(y − q +
c(x− p)) = 0.
(a) For c = 1, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) is the only intersection if p + q = 1. This implies that the
limiting QRE is (1, 1) if x+ y > 1 for any λ > 0 and is (0, 0) if x+ y < 1 for any λ > 0 .
Let λ → 0+, Eq.(2.3.1) could be approximated as
x ≈ 1
2
+ λ(y − q)σ′(0)
y ≈ 1
2
+ λ(x− p)σ′(0) (2.3.3)
and
x+ y ≈ 1 + λ(1− p− q)σ′(0) (2.3.4)
Hence, the limiting point is (1, 1) if p+ q < 1 and is (0, 0) if p+ q > 1.
(b) For c = 1, suppose that c < 1. Clearly, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) is an intersection, and another
intersection is (1−cp−q
1−c ,
cp+q−c
1−c , λ(p, q)), where λ(p, q) is the solution of
1− cp− q
1− c = σ(λ(p, q)c
p+ q − 1
1− c ) (2.3.5)
If (1−cp−q
1−c ,
cp+q−c
1−c ) is not in region [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0,∞), i.e., cp + q < c or 1 < cp + q or
(p + q − 1)(cp + q − 1
2
− c
2
) < 0, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) is the only intersecting point. In this case, the
limiting QRE is (1, 1) if x+ y > 1 for any λ > 0 and is (0, 0) if x+ y < 1 for any λ > 0.
Similarly as (a), for λ → 0+, Eq.(2.3.1) could be approximated as
x ≈ 1
2
+ λ(y − q)σ′(0)
y ≈ 1
2
+ λc(x− p)σ′(0) (2.3.6)
and
x+ y ≈ 1 + λ(1
2
+
c
2
− q − cp)σ′(0). (2.3.7)
3The bimatrix game Eq.(2.2.1) is symmetric if and only if c = 1 and p + q = 1. Thus, Theorem 2.1
implies that the limiting QRE does not exist for all 2 × 2 symmetric games with a unique symmetric
mixed Nash equilibrium.
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This implies that x + y < 1 if and only if cp + q > 1
2
+ c
2
. Hence, (0, 0) is selected if
p+ q > 1 and cp+ q > 1
2
+ c
2
, and (1, 1) is selected if p+ q < 1 and cp+ q < 1
2
+ c
2
. 
For 2×2 bimatrix games, (1, 1) is risk dominant if and only if the Nash products satisfy
the inequality c(1− q)(1− p) > cpq, i.e., p+ q < 1 (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Theorem
2.1 suggests that the quantal response equilibrium selection conforms to the Nash product
rule if and only if c = 1, although the QRE method is very close to the ”tracing procedure”
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988; Harsanyi, 1975). On the other hand, (1, 1) is the limiting
QRE if p < 1
2
and q < 1
2
. This implies that if a strategy is ”risk dominant for both
players”, it will be selected by the QRE methods independent of c. Turocy (2005) made
a mistake in his proof of Theorem 7 that applied this stronger condition instead of the
Nash product rule.
As an extension of Theorem 2.1(b), we look at two limit cases c = 0 and c = ∞.
If c = 0, Eq.(2.3.5) has a solution if and only if q = 1
2
. Hence, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) is the unique
intersection if q = 1
2
. From Eq.(2.3.7), (1, 1) ((0, 0)) is the limiting QRE if and only if
q < 1
2
(q > 1
2
), which is independent of p. This implies that the inﬂuence of player B on
the equilibrium selection is negligible if its payoﬀ is much less than player A. Similarly, if
c → ∞, (1, 1) ((0, 0)) is the limiting QRE if and only if p < 1
2
(p > 1
2
), which is independent
of q. This shows clearly that our equilibrium selection method depends crucially on c, in
contrast to Nash products.
One may notice that limit set of QRE as λ → +∞ has three Nash equilibria, but
Theorem 2.1 only mentioned the two pure Nash equilibria. In fact, Theorem 2.2 will
show that there is no path connecting the mixed equilibrium (p, q) and the centroid (1
2
, 1
2
)
for almost all coordination games.
In order to derive a precise result of equilibrium selection, we introduce a new concept.
For given c, deﬁne the separatrix as the curve in the p−q plane separating the two regions
where the limiting QRE are (0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively. Theorem 2.1 says that the
separatrix lies between lines p+ q = 1 and cp+ q = 1
2
+ c
2
. Furthermore, (1, 1) is selected
for (p, q) below the separatrix and (0, 0) is selected for (p, q) above the separatrix. (See
Figure 2.3.1) In the rest of this section, we will derive an expression of the separatrix.
Deﬁne f = σ−1 . Clearly, f is an increasing function in [0, 1], where f(0) = −∞,
f(1
2
) = 0, f(1) = +∞, f ′′(x) ≥ 0 if x < 1
2
and f ′′(x) ≤ 0 if x > 1
2
. The projection of
Eq.(2.3.1) on x− y plane is then written as
(y − q)f(y) = c(x− p)f(x) (2.3.8)
since
f(x) = λ(y − q)
f(y) = λc(x− p) (2.3.9)
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Figure 2.3.1: Separatrix on the p−q plane, and its tangent line at p = q = 1
2
, for c = 0.25.
Figures (a)-(f) are respectively the logit equilibrium, the probit equilibrium, the Cauchy
noise, the exponential noise, the uniform noise and the logarithmic game. Circles denote
numerically computed points on the separatrices. The slope of the tangent line is −1
2
(independently of σ). The Nash equilibrium (1, 1) is selected for (p, q) in the region below
the separatrix and (0, 0) is selected for (p, q) in the region above the separatrix. The linear
approximation is works well for these six types of quantal response functions.
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From Eq.(2.3.9), each solution of Eq.(2.3.8) corresponds to a unique QRE. Therefore, we
turn to investigate the graph of Eq.(2.3.8) instead of Eq.(2.3.1).
Theorem 2.2
For almost all parameters, the graph of Eq.(2.3.8) consists of two (disjoint) branches,
where one passes through the mixed equilibrium (p, q) and the other passes through the
centroid (1
2
, 1
2
). For the critical case, two branches intersect at a singular point.
Proof:
One can easily calculate that Eq.(2.3.8) has four interior solutions, (1
2
, 1
2
), (p, 1
2
), (1
2
, q)
and (p, q), and four boundary solutions (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). For convenience, we
divide the x − y plane to nine regions by four lines x = 1
2
, x = p, y = 1
2
and y = q, and
study the graph of Eq.(2.3.8) in each region. Clearly, no solution in regions (2), (4), (6)
and (8). Furthermore, λ > 0 in region (1) and (9), and λ < 0 in region (3) and (7). (See
Figure 2.3.2 (a))
Without loss of generality, assume p > 1
2
and q < 1
2
. Deﬁne
S(x, y) = (y − q)f(y)− c(x− p)f(x) (2.3.10)
and the derivatives of S(x, y) satisfy
Sx = −c(x− p)f ′(x)− cf(x)
Sxx = −c(2f ′(x) + (x− p)f ′′(x))
Sy = (y − q)f ′′(y) + f(y)
Syy = 2f
′(y) + (y − q)f ′′(y) (2.3.11)
From the properties of f , we have Sx < 0 if x > p, Sx > 0 if x <
1
2
, Sy > 0 if y >
1
2
,
Sy < 0 if y < q, Sxx ≤ 0 if 12 < x < p and Syy ≥ 0 if q < y < 12 .
Hence, in region (1), S(x, y) = 0 is a increasing curve from (0, 0) to (1
2
, q) since Sx > 0
and Sy < 0; in region (3), it is a decreasing curve from (p, q) to (1, 0) since Sx < 0 and
Sy < 0; in region (5), it is a decreasing curve from (0, 1) to (
1
2
, 1
2
) since Sx > 0 and Sy > 0;
and in region (9), it is a increasing curve from (p, 1
2
) to (1, 1) since Sx < 0 and Sy > 0.
(See Figure 2.3.2 (a))
On the other hand, in region (5), we have Sxx ≤ 0 and Syy ≥ 0, i.e., S is a convex
function of y and a concave function of x. This implies that for given yˆ, S(x, y) = 0 has (a)
two solutions (xˆ1, yˆ) and (xˆ2, yˆ) if S(x
∗, yˆ) > 0, (b) one solution (x∗, yˆ) if and S(x∗, yˆ) = 0
(c) no solution if S(x∗, yˆ) < 0 , where Sx(x∗) = 0 and xˆ1 < x∗ < xˆ2. Similarly, for given
xˆ, S = 0 has (d) two solutions (xˆ, yˆ1) and (xˆ, yˆ2) if S(xˆ, y
∗) < 0, (e) one solution (xˆ, y∗) if
S(xˆ, y∗) = 0 and (f) no solution if S(xˆ, y∗) > 0, where Sy(y∗) = 0 and yˆ1 < y∗ < yˆ2. Thus,
the graph of S(x, y) = 0 in region (5) consists of two disjoint curves that separated by line
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Figure 2.3.2: Logit equilibrium correspondence for the coordination game. λ ≥ 0 on
solid curves but λ < 0 on dashed curves. Black points are NE and red points are (1
2
, 1
2
).
Parameters are taken as p = 0.3, c = 0.25, q = 0.7 in (a), q = 0.6005 in (b), and q = 0.5
in (c). For almost all games, the graph of Eq.(2.3.8) consists of two branches, where one
passes through the mixed equilibrium (p, q) and the other passes through the centroid
(1
2
, 1
2
). In the critical case (b), two branches intersect at a singular point.
x = x∗ if S(x∗, y∗) > 0 (from (a) and (f)) and separated by line y = y∗ if S(x∗, y∗) < 0
(from (c) and (d)).
In sum, the graph of S(x, y) = 0 consists of two branches, where the Nash equilibrium
(p, q) and the centroid (1
2
, 1
2
) are always on diﬀerent branches. Furthermore, (1
2
, 1
2
) is on
the curve passing through (0, 0) if and only if S(x∗, y∗) > 0 and x∗ > 1
2
or S(x∗, y∗) < 0
and y∗ > 1
2
. For the critical case S(x∗, y∗) = 0, two branches intersect at a singular point
(x∗, y∗). (See Figure 2.3.2 (b)) 
Theorem 2.2 implies that the limiting QRE is (0, 0) (or (1, 1)) if and only if (0, 0) (or
(1, 1)) and (1
2
, 1
2
) are on the same branch. On the other hand, (p, q) can not be selected
for almost all games since there is no path from (1
2
, 1
2
) to it. However, in the critical case,
two branches intersect at a singular point (x∗, y∗) (we simply note it by (x, y) in later
discussions) and tracing the branch of QRE correspondence beginning at the centroid
could reach all three Nash equilibria. Thus, (p, q) is on the separatrix if and only if
Eq.(2.3.8) has a singular point.
From the proof of Theorem 2.2, the singular point satisﬁes
S(x, y) = (y − p)f(y)− c(x− p)f(x) = 0
Sx(x, y) = f(x) + (x− p)f ′(x) = 0
Sy(x, y) = f(y) + (y − q)f ′(y) = 0 (2.3.12)
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and this yields
p = x+
f(x)
f ′(x)
,
q = y +
f(y)
f ′(y)
. (2.3.13)
Deﬁne F (x) = x+ f(x)
f ′(x) . It is easy to see that F (
1
2
) = 1
2
since f(1
2
) = 0. Notice that
F ′(x) = 2− f(x)f
′′(x)
f ′(x)2
> 0 (2.3.14)
, F (x) is an increasing function. Hence, Eq.(2.3.8) could be written as
(F−1(q)− q)f(F−1(q)) = c(F−1(p)− p)f(F−1(p)). (2.3.15)
For convenience, deﬁne H(p) = (F−1(p)− p)1/2f(F−1(p))1/2. The expression of the sepa-
ratrix is then simpliﬁed as
H(q) = −c1/2H(p) (2.3.16)
where the minus is decided by Theorem 2.1.
Since H(1
2
) = 0, the separatrix can be reduced to
q =
1
2
− c1/2(p− 1
2
) (2.3.17)
after ignoring the high order terms of H(p). Eq.(2.3.17) shows that the ﬁrst order term
is independent of the quantal response function.
2.4 Diﬀerent types of quantal response functions
Eq.(2.3.17) provides a linear approximation of the separatrix but one may doubt that
whether this oversimpliﬁcation is appropriate. In this section, we are going to derive the
high order terms of the separatrix for six diﬀerent types of quantal response functions.
In general, the separatrix does not have an explicit formula (except in section 2.4.6). We
provide both the power series and numerical simulations and show that the limiting QRE
is aﬀected little by the noise structure but mainly decided by the payoﬀ matrix. This
implies that Eq.(2.3.17) is a good approximation for the equilibrium selection by QRE
methods. Based on the logarithmic game (Harsanyi, 1973), we ﬁnd a simple rule to decide
the limiting QRE: the strategy with larger sum of square root payoﬀ is selected.
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2.4.1 Logit equilibrium
The ﬁrst example is the logit equilibrium discussed in section 2.2. If the noises follow the
extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function exp(− exp(−λε − γ)),
the quantal response function is
σ(u) =
1
1 + e−u
. (2.4.1)
By using the Taylor expansion, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp+
1
6
Δp3 +
17
120
Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.2)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp+ (−1
6
c1/2 +
1
6
c3/2)Δp3
+(
1
12
c3/2 − 17
120
c1/2 +
7
120
c5/2)Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.3)
where Δp = p− 1
2
and Δq = q − 1
2
. (See Figure 2.3.1 (a))
2.4.2 Probit equilibrium
If the random perturbations follow the normal distribution (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997;
Staudigl, 2011), σ(u) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution,
i.e.,
σ(u) = Φ(u) =
1√
2π
∫ u
−∞
e−t
2/2dt. (2.4.4)
By using the Taylor expansion, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp+
π
24
Δp3 +
19π2
1920
Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.5)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp+ (− 1
24
c1/2 +
1
24
c3/2)πΔp3
+(
1
640
c3/2 − 19
1920
c1/2 +
1
640
c5/2)π2Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.6)
(See Figure 2.3.1 (b))
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2.4.3 Cauchy noise
Another famous noise structure is the Cauchy noise, which is the quotient distribution
of two normal variables. An interpretation is that the noise comes from evaluating the
frequencies of strategies. In this case, σ(u) is the cumulative distribution function of the
Cauchy distribution, i.e.,
σ(u) =
1
π
arctan(u) +
1
2
. (2.4.7)
By using the Taylor expansion, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp+
π2
24
Δp3 +
13π4
1920
Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.8)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp+ (− 1
24
c1/2 +
1
24
c3/2)π2Δp3
+(
1
192
c3/2 − 13
1920
c1/2 +
1
640
c5/2)π4Δp5 + o(Δp7) (2.4.9)
(See Figure 2.3.1 (c))
2.4.4 Exponential noise
If the random perturbations follow the exponential distribution, σ(u) is the cumulative
distribution function of the Laplace distribution, i.e.,
σ(u) =
{
eu
2
u < 0
1− e−u
2
0 ≤ u (2.4.10)
In this case, σ is not smooth at 0. Nevertheless, method in section 2.3 is well deﬁned
since σ′′(u) > 0 for u < 0 and σ′′(u) < 0 for u > 0.
For p < 1/2, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp+
1
4
Δp2 +
1
6
Δp3 +
29
192
Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.11)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp+ (1
4
c1/2 − 1
4
c)Δp2 + (
1
8
c− 1
6
c1/2 − 1
6
c3/2)Δp3
+(− 19
192
c+
29
192
c1/2 +
1
8
c3/2 − 29
192
c2)Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.12)
From the symmetry of σ(u), for p > 1/2, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp− 1
4
Δp2 +
1
6
Δp3 − 29
192
Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.13)
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and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp− (1
4
c1/2 − 1
4
c)Δp2 + (
1
8
c− 1
6
c1/2 − 1
6
c3/2)Δp3
−(− 19
192
c+
29
192
c1/2 +
1
8
c3/2 − 29
192
c2)Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.14)
(See Figure 2.3.1 (d))
2.4.5 Uniform noise
If the perturbations follow the uniform distribution (Gale et al., 1995), σ(u) is the cumu-
lative distribution function of the triangular distribution
σ(u) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 u < −1
(1+u)2
2
−1 ≤ u < 0
1− (1−u)2
2
0 ≤ u < 1
1 1 ≤ u
(2.4.15)
Similarly as the exponential distribution, σ is not smooth at 0 but σ′′(u) = 1 > 0 for
u < 0 and σ′′(u) = −1 < 0 for u > 0.
For p < 1/2, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp+
1
8
Δp2 +
1
16
Δp3 +
23
512
Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.16)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp− (1
8
c1/2 − 1
8
c)Δp2 + (− 1
32
c− 1
16
c1/2 +
1
32
c3/2)Δp3
+(− 9
512
c− 23
512
c1/2 +
3
256
c3/2 − 1
64
c2)Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.17)
From the symmetry of σ(u), for p > 1/2, high order terms of H(p) are
H(p) = Δp− 1
8
Δp2 +
1
16
Δp3 − 23
512
Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.18)
and the separatrix could be written as
Δq = −c1/2Δp+ (1
8
c1/2 − 1
8
c)Δp2 + (− 1
32
c− 1
16
c1/2 +
1
32
c3/2)Δp3
+(
9
512
c+
23
512
c1/2 − 3
256
c3/2 +
1
64
c2)Δp4 + o(Δp5) (2.4.19)
(See Figure 2.3.1 (e))
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2.4.6 Logarithmic game
The last example is the logarithmic game introduced by Harsanyi (1973). In this game, a
player’s utility has the form λ
λ+1
U + 1
λ+1
L with λ ≥ 0, where U depends on payoﬀ matrix
and L depends on the player’s own strategy. For 2× 2 bimatrix games, payoﬀ functions
are deﬁned as
uˆ1(x) =
λ
λ+ 1
(xy(1− q) + (1− x)(1− y)q) + 1
λ+ 1
log(x(1− x))
uˆ2(y) =
λ
λ+ 1
(yxc(1− p) + (1− y)(1− x)cp) + 1
λ+ 1
log(y(1− y)) (2.4.20)
where uˆi(x) is the payoﬀ for player i using strategy x.
Suppose that individuals choose strategies maximizing their payoﬀs. The correspond-
ing QRE is then the solution of
∂uˆi(x)
∂x
=
λ
λ+ 1
(y − q) + 1
λ+ 1
1− 2x
x(1− x) = 0
∂uˆ2(y)
∂y
=
λ
λ+ 1
(x− p) + 1
λ+ 1
1− 2y
y(1− y) = 0 (2.4.21)
where the quantal response function is
σ(u) =
1
2
+
u
4(1 +
√
u2/4 + 1)
(2.4.22)
From Eq.(2.3.12) to Eq.(2.3.16), we obtain
H(p) =
√
1
2
−
√
1
4
− (p− 1
2
)2 (2.4.23)
and the separatrix has an explicit formula
q =
1
2
− c1/2
√
1
2
−
√
1
4
− (p− 1
2
)2
√
1− c(1
2
−
√
1
4
− (p− 1
2
)2) (2.4.24)
Interestingly, Eq.(2.4.24) is equivalent to the following simpler expression√
1− q +
√
c(1− p) = √q +√cp (2.4.25)
which means that the strategy with larger sum of square root payoﬀ will be selected.
Since the equilibrium selection is aﬀected little by the quantal response function,
Eq.(2.4.25) then provides a simple way to estimate the limiting QRE directly from the
non-normalized payoﬀ matrix. Nash equilibrium (A1, B1) is selected by the QRE methods
if it has larger sum of square root payoﬀ, i.e.,
√
a11 − a21 +
√
b11 − b21 >
√
a22 − a12 +
√
b22 − b12 (2.4.26)
(See Figure 2.3.1 (f))
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2.5 Application
In this section, we study the public goods game (PGG) with punishment (Sigmund et al.,
2000, 2001). The only strict Nash equilibrium in this game is that do not contribute to
the public pool and do not punish free riders. However, empirical researches indicated
that punishment can curb free-riding. By applying the results in section 2.3, we ﬁnd that
a cooperative equilibrium is selected by the QRE method if the punishment is strong
enough. For intermediate punishment, cooperation could also dominate the population
when λ is not so large even if the limiting logit equilibrium is defection. By comparing
the QRE model to past experiments, we hope to explain how punishment works in the
real world.
2.5.1 Public goods game with punishment
Following Sigmund et al. (2001), we consider a two players PGG, where both can send
a beneﬁt b to their coplayer at a cost of a. In the second stage, they are oﬀered the
opportunity to punish their coplayer by imposing a ﬁne. The ﬁne amounts to a loss β
to the punished player, and it entails a cost α to the punisher. Let us label with C
(cooperator) those players who cooperate by sending a beneﬁt and with D (defector)
those who do not. Let P denotes those who punish defectors and N those who do not.
The payoﬀ matrix is then written as
P N
C
D
( −a, b −a, b
−β,−α 0, 0
)
(2.5.1)
This mini PGG with punishment is obviously equivalent to the mini ultimatum game
or the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment (Gale et al., 1995; Nowak et al., 2000;
Dreber et al., 2008). The game has inﬁnite number of Nash equilibria, one pure Nash
equilibrium (0, 0) and non-isolated Nash equilibria (1, yˆ), where a
β
≤ yˆ ≤ 1. However, all
the cooperative equilibria are weakly dominated by the second-order free-riding, (1, 0).
Therefore, defecting and refusing to punish is the only strict Nash equilibrium. (See
Figure 2.5.1 (a))
2.5.2 Quantal response method
We ﬁrst normalize the payoﬀ matrix as Eq.(2.2.1), where p = 1, q = a
β
, c = α
β
. This is
the limit case of the coordination game. From Eq.(2.3.1), the limit QRE set consist of
three equilibria only, one asocial equilibrium (0, 0) and two cooperative equilibria (1, 1
2
)
and (1, q). Similarly as Theorem 2.2, we can easily prove that the graph of Eq.(2.3.8)
consists of two branches for almost all parameters, where the Nash equilibrium (1, q) and
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Figure 2.5.1: Logit equilibrium correspondence for the public goods game with punish-
ment. a = α = 1, b = 2, β = 5 in Figures (a) and (b), and β = 4 in Figure (c). λ ≥ 0 on
solid curves but λ < 0 on dashed curves. Black points are NE and red point is (1
2
, 1
2
). Red
curves and blue curves denote the frequencies of cooperation and punishment, respec-
tively. (a) The graph of Eq.(2.3.8) consists of two branches, where one passes through the
Nash equilibrium (1, q) and the other passes through the centroid (1
2
, 1
2
). (b) The limiting
logit equilibrium is the cooperative equilibrium (1, 1
2
). (c) The limiting logit equilibrium
is the asocial equilibrium (0, 0) but cooperation can dominate the population for small
value of λ.
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the centroid (1
2
, 1
2
) are always on diﬀerent branches. (See Figure 2.5.1 (a)) By using the
linear approximation Eq.(2.3.17), the limiting logit is (1, 1
2
), cooperate in the ﬁrst stage
and punish defectors with probability one half in the second stage, if
2β > 4a+ α +
√
8aα + α2 (2.5.2)
Hence, quantal response methods choose the cooperative equilibrium if the punishment
is strong enough. For instance, if the cost of cooperation is equal to the cost of punishment,
i.e., a = α, Eq.(2.5.2) can be simpliﬁed as β > 4α. The limiting logit equilibrium is
the cooperative equilibrium if the punishment/cost ratio (also called the eﬀectiveness of
punishment) is greater than four. (See Figure 2.5.1) On the other hand, if the cost of
punishment is greatly larger than the cost of cooperation, i.e., α >> a, Eq.(2.5.2) reduces
to β > α. In this case, punishment can be selected for lower eﬀectiveness.
Intuitively, we say that cooperation is ”dominant” in the population if more than half
of all players contribute in the ﬁrst stage. Denote the frequencies of C and P by x and y,
respectively. From Eq.(2.3.10) and Eq.(2.3.11), the maximum value of x on the branch of
QRE correspondence starting at the centroid is larger than one half if and only if q < 1
2
.
This implies that if β > 2a, cooperation could dominate the population for some values
of λ even if the QRE correspondence eventually converges to the asocial equilibrium. For
instance, if a = α = 1 and c = 4, the limiting logit equilibrium is (0, 0) but the proportion
of cooperators can reach 70 percent when 6 < λ < 8. (Figure 2.5.1 (c))
2.5.3 How punishment works
Punishment of defectors is a key point for the explanation of cooperation. A large amount
of empirical studies indicate that the eﬀectiveness of punishment plays an important role
in rasing contributions in the PGG. For instance, Sefton et al. (2007) used a punishment
eﬀectiveness of one and there is no diﬀerences between control groups and treatment.
However, Fehr and Gachter (2002) considered a punishment eﬀectiveness of three and the
opportunity to punish increases cooperation signiﬁcantly.
Recently, Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) compared PGGs with punishment/cost
ratios from 0 to 4. They ﬁnd that contributions to the public pool increase monotonically
in eﬀectiveness. With a punishment eﬀectiveness of two or less, contributions remain
constant at best or decline over time. Only a punishment eﬀectiveness of three or four
leads to high contribution rates and 4:1 punishment technology works better than other
ratios in promoting cooperation. Our model conﬁrms those empirical results, although
they cannot be compared directly since the reduction to two players may aﬀect an essential
aspect of the PGG game.
Since punishment is often costly, this gives rise to an issue of second-order free-riding.
Why people punish defectors? Explanations include reputation (Sigmund et al., 2001;
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Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010), social norm (Henrich et al., 2006; Her-
rmann et al., 2008), individual preference (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or neurology (De
Quervain et al., 2004). Diﬀerent from above mechanisms, QRE method assumes that
players are boundedly rational and adopt the probabilistic best response function. If the
ﬁne to defectors is suﬃciently large, the frequency of cooperation increases rapidly. A
minority of irrational punishers can force a majority of individuals learn to cooperate and
population will converge to homogenous cooperation before all punishers turn to second-
order free-riders. However, if the punishment is not strong enough, punishers go extinct
at ﬁrst and defectors will ﬁnally dominate the population.
2.6 Conclusion
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) deﬁned the equilibrium selection by tracing the logit equilib-
rium correspondence. In section 2.3, we extend their idea to the more general structural
QRE with admissible noises (Goeree et al., 2005). Admissibility assumes that the errors
on the payoﬀ functions are continuous, unbiased and independent across players, which
involves a large family of probability distributions, such as logistic distribution and normal
distribution. For almost all 2×2 coordination games, the QRE correspondence consists of
two (disjoint) branches, where one connects the mixed Nash equilibrium to a pure Nash
equilibrium, and the second connects the centroid to another pure Nash equilibrium. The
pure Nash equilibrium on the second branch is the limiting QRE. In the critical case
where parameters are on the separatrix, two branches intersect at a singular point and
tracing the QRE correspondence could reach all Nash equilibria.
For the expression of the separatrix, the ﬁrst order term depends on the payoﬀ matrix
only, where the slope is −√c. In section 2.4, we derive the high order terms for six
diﬀerent quantal response functions. Both the power series and the numerical simulations
show that the equilibrium selection is aﬀected little by the noise distribution but mainly
decided by the payoﬀ matrix. This result is diﬀerent from the noisy best response approach
suggested by Staudigl (2011). He calculated the evolutionary path by the optimal control
method, but linear terms of the separatrices for the probit noise and the logit noise are not
the same. In the logarithmic game, we ﬁnd a simple square root rule to decide the limiting
QRE: A Nash equilibrium is selected if and only if it has larger sum of square root payoﬀ.
In particular, this formula is also a good approximation for the other equilibrium selections
discussed in section 2.4 since they have similar separatrices. (See Figure 2.3.1) The square
root rule is distinct from the Nash product rule of the risk dominant equilibrium, which
is independent of c. Two rules are equivalent if and only if c = 1, which means that
two types of players have the same learning rate. Unfortunately, Turocy (2005) made a
mistake in his paper (Theorem 7).
In this chapter, we consider the structural QRE where noises are independently and
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identically distributed. However, our results are also true for non-identical noises since
the proofs of Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 only need continuity and independence. In calculating
the separatrix, we assume that noises follow a unimodal distribution. However, this
assumption does not aﬀect the linear approximation Eq.(2.3.17) since the ﬁrst order term
is independent of the noise structure. In addition, our technique also works for quantal
response functions without explicit noise structures, such as the logarithmic game of
Harsanyi (1973).
Finally, we apply the quantal response method to the public goods game with punish-
ment. Equilibrium analysis indicates that the only strict Nash equilibrium is that players
do not contribute to the public pool and do not punish free riders. This contradicts
empirical evidence. However, punishment can promote cooperation if players are bound-
edly rational that make mistakes in evaluating the payoﬀ functions. When punishment
is strong enough, a cooperative equilibrium can be selected as the limiting QRE. In this
case, a minority of irrational punishers force the population to evolve to homogenous
cooperation before all punishers turn to second-order free riders.
CHAPTER 2. QRE: BIMATRIX GAMES 54
Chapter 3
Social learning in the ultimatum
game
Abstract
In the ultimatum game, two players divide a sum of money. The proposer suggests how
to split and the responder can accept or reject. If the suggestion is rejected, both players
get nothing. The rational solution is that the responder accepts even the smallest oﬀer
but human prefer the fair share. In this chapter, we study the ultimatum game by a
learning-mutation process based on the quantal response equilibrium. Social learning is
never stabilized at the fair outcome or the rational outcome, but leads to oscillations from
oﬀering 40 percent to 50 percent. More precisely, there is a clear tendency to increase the
mean oﬀer if it is lower than 40 percent, but will decrease when it reaches the fair oﬀer.
Key words
Ultimatum game; quantal response equilibrium; learning-mutation process
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3.1 Introduction
Ultimatum game introduced by Guth et al. (1982) is one of the most inﬂuential games
in experimental economics that people in the real world do not behave rational. The
setting of the game is quiet simple. Two players divide a sum of money. The proposer
makes an oﬀer how to split and the responder decides whether to accept. If the oﬀer is
rejected, both players get nothing. A rational responder ought to accept any non-zero
oﬀer. Therefore, a selﬁsh proposer who thinks that the responder is rational should oﬀer
the minimal. Game theory predicts the rational outcome, however, empirical studies in
human society, including both laboratory games and ﬁeld games, prefer fair outcome. In
hundreds of ultimatum games conducted in diﬀerent countries in last 30 years, proposers
on average oﬀer 40 to 50 percent of the total sum to the responder. Responders usually
accept oﬀers higher than 40 percent and about half of all responders reject oﬀers below 30
percent (Roth et al., 1995; Kagel and Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Osterbeek and Kuilen,
2004; Cooper and Dutcher, 2010; Henrich et al., 2001, 2006, 2010).
How to understand people rejecting positive oﬀers? One well known explanation is
that irrational individuals have preference on fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000). In these models, utility functions of players depend not only on
their own payoﬀ but also the payoﬀ of the others. Responders reject low oﬀers because
the disutility of receiving a payoﬀ less than the proposer is greater than the utility of
getting small monetary beneﬁts. On the other hand, the rejection of a unfair oﬀer can be
seen as a kind of punishment that inhibits selﬁsh behaviors in later rounds. In iterated
ultimatum game experiments, average oﬀers are much more close to the fair share (Roth et
al., 1995; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Brenner and Vriend, 2006; Fischbacher et al., 2009).
However, this contradicts the equilibrium analysis since the only subgame perfection is
not to reject.
In this chapter, we study the iterated ultimatum game by social learning. To analyze
the game, deﬁne individual strategy as S(x, y, p), meaning giving x of the total sum to the
responder when acting as proposer and rejecting any oﬀer less than y with probability p
(and accepting oﬀers equal or higher than y with probability 1) when acting as responder,
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 < p ≤ 1. Following this deﬁnition, the rational strategy is
written as S(e, e, 1), where e is the minimum oﬀer greater than 0, and the fair strategy
is S(1
2
, 1
2
, 1). In our model, individuals strategies will be updated by a learning-mutation
process.
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3.2 The model
3.2.1 Mini ultimatum game
Before studying the ultimatum game with continuous strategies, we ﬁrst consider the
iterated mini ultimatum game with only two possible oﬀers h and l, with 0 ≤ l < h ≤ 1
(Gale et al., 1995; Nowak et al., 2000; Sigmund et al., 2001; Abbink, 2001; Falk et al.,
2003). In each round, the proposer has to choose between the high oﬀer h (labeled by H)
or the low oﬀer l (labeled by L), and the responder has to decide to reject the low oﬀer l
(labeled by H) or accept (labeled by L). The payoﬀ matrix is then written as
H L
H
L
(
1− h, h 1− h, h
0, 0 1− l, l
)
(3.2.1)
where the proposer plays rows and the responder plays columns. 1 The mini game has
a strict Nash equilibrium, (L,L), and non-isolated Nash equilibria, (H, sH + (1 − s)L),
where h−l
1−l ≤ s ≤ 1. Since each equilibrium (H, sH + (1 − s)L) is weakly dominated
by (H,L), (L,L) is the only subgame perfection. Therefore, rational players will choose
(L,L) according to backward induction.
3.2.2 Quantal response equilibrium
There are many ways to model social learning (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Gale et al.,
1995; Roth and Erev, 1995; Abbink, 2001; Kirman and Virend, 2001). In this chapter, we
study the quantal response equilibrium (QRE, also called the perturbed best response)
introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998; Goeree et al., 2005; Yi, 2005; Sandholm,
2010). In a quantal response equilibrium, players are assumed to be boundedly rational.
They observe random perturbations on the payoﬀs of strategies and choose optimally
according to those noisy observations. The most common speciﬁcation of QRE is the
logit equilibrium, where noises follow the extreme value distribution (Blume, 1993, 1995;
Turocy, 2005). Let uij denotes the expected payoﬀ of player i using strategy j, where
j = 1, , Ji. For any given λ ≥ 0, the logistic response function is deﬁned as
σij(u¯i) =
eλuij∑Ji
k=1 e
λuik
(3.2.2)
, where σij is the probability that player i adopts strategy j and u¯i = (ui1, ..., uiJi). If
each player uses a logistic response function, QRE or logit equilibria are the solutions of
1Payoﬀ matrix Eq.(3.2.1) can also be explained as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment (see
Eq.(2.5.1) in chapter 2), where H and L correspond to Cooperation and Defection, and P means paying
l to punish defector 1− l. Similarly as the mini ultimatum game, (L,N) is the only subgame perfection.
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πij = σij, where πij is the frequency of strategy j in player i. λ has been interpreted
as the intensity of experience (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). At λ = 0, players have no
information about the game and each strategy is chosen with equal probability. As λ
approaches inﬁnity, players achieve full information about the game and play the best
response.
The quantal response method has been widely used to explain experimental data. In
iterated games, estimates of λ usually increase as the game progresses (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995, 1998). As players gain experience from repeated observations, they can
be expected to make more precise estimates and ﬁnally reach a Nash equilibrium. To
describe this process, consider QRE as a function of λ. When λ = 0, the QRE is at
the centroid of the simplex and when λ = +∞, the QRE set consists of Nash equilibria
only. As pointed out by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), for almost all norm form games,
the graph of the logit equilibria correspondence contains a unique branch which starts for
λ = 0 at the centroid and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as λ goes to inﬁnity.
This then deﬁnes a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibrium by ”tracing” the
graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence starting at the centroid. The selected Nash
equilibrium is called the limiting logit equilibrium (LLE) of the game.
Following subsection 2.5.2 in chapter 2, for almost all mini ultimatum games, the LLE
is one of two Nash equilibria only, either (L,L), giving the low oﬀer and accepting the
low oﬀer, or (H, H
2
+ L
2
), giving the high oﬀer and rejecting the low oﬀer with probability
one half. Approximately, (H, H
2
+ L
2
) is the LLE if and only if
2h < l + 1−
√
l(1− l) (3.2.3)
In the calculation of Eq.(3.2.3), high order terms of the Taylor expansion are ignored,
which relate to the quantal response function. Subsection 2.4.1 in chapter 2 shows that
coeﬃcients of high order terms are very small therefore aﬀect little to the equilibrium
selection.
If the high oﬀer is the fair oﬀer, i.e., h = 1
2
, Eq.(3.2.3) tells us that social learning
chooses the low oﬀer. In fact, any high oﬀer equal of greater than 1
2
is unfavored. On the
other hand, if the low oﬀer is the rational decision, i.e., l = e, any high oﬀer smaller than
1−√e
2
is selected. Therefore, social learning does not always choose the rational outcome.
For convenience, we say that oﬀer x1 dominates oﬀer x2 if x1 is the LLE of the mini
ultimatum game with oﬀers x1 and x2. Dominant regions of x1 and x2 are shown in
Figure 3.2.1. Oﬀers lower than 1
2
are dominated by slightly higher oﬀers. For l < 1
2
, the
right side of Eq.(3.2.3) is a convex function, where at the minimum l∗ = 2−
√
2
4
≈ 0.15 and
h∗ = 3−
√
2
4
≈ 0.4. This implies that if h∗ ≤ x < 1
2
, x is also dominated by some low oﬀers.
In particular, h∗ dominates almost all lower oﬀers (the only exception is l∗).
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Figure 3.2.1: Pairwise invasibility plot. x1 and x2 are dominant in white and gray re-
gions, respectively. Every oﬀer x1 lower than 0.5 is dominated by some higher oﬀers and
strategies equal or greater than 0.4 are also dominated by lower oﬀers.
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3.2.3 Learning-mutation process
Let us now introduce the learning-mutation process on the continuum of all strategies.
Consider a population of n players. In each generation, players are randomly anonymously
paired and play the iterated mini ultimatum game. In each group, roles of two members
are decided randomly before the game starts and do not change in an interaction. Two
players update their strategies by the quantal response learning and the interaction will
stop if they reach a Nash equilibrium since in this situation both are unwilling to change.
Mutations happen after all the groups reach Nash equilibria. With probability μ, players
adopt a new strategy, plus or minus a small random value on their former strategies. (See
Figure 3.2.2 for an example)
We ﬁrst look at the learning process in one generation. Denote the mini ultimatum
game where the proposer using strategy S(x1, y1, p1) and the responder using strategy
S(x2, y2, p2) by UG(S(x1, y1, p1), S(x2, y2, p2)). In this game, the proposer oﬀers x1 and
the responder rejects oﬀers lower than y2 with probability p2. Without loss of generality,
suppose that y2 is the high oﬀer h and x1 is the low oﬀer l. At the beginning, both
players have the motivation to adjust their original strategies. That is, the proposer
tends to increase his oﬀer from x1 to y2 in order to avoid being refused, and meanwhile,
the responder tends to decrease his acceptance level from y2 to x1.
2 Eq.(3.2.3) provides
an approximated rule to decide the LLE. At the LLE, the responder either accepts the
low oﬀer or rejects the low oﬀer with probability one half. Therefore, we always take
p = 1
2
and write S(x, y) = S(x, y, 1
2
) in later discussions. At the end of iterated game
UG(S(x1, y1), S(x2, y2)), if x1 dominates y2, the proposer keeps his strategy unchanged
but the responder adopts a new strategy S(x2, x1). In contrast, if y2 dominates x1, the
responder’s strategy does not change but the proposer adopts a new strategy S(y2, y1).
We observe that learning always decreases the diversity of possible oﬀers since in each
mini game, one dominated oﬀer is eliminated.
Next, consider a population that consists only of S(x, y) players evolves under the
learning (no mutation) process. At the end of iterated game UG(S(x, y), S(x, y)), strate-
gies of two players are S(x, y) and S(x, x) if x dominates y, and are S(y, y) and S(x, y)
if y dominates x. In the ﬁrst case, the population will converge to a pure S(x, x) pop-
ulation, while in the second case, it will converge to a pure S(y, y) population. More
generally, starting with any mixed population, the learning process will always lead to a
homogenous population where the oﬀer equals to the acceptance level since the diversity
of possible oﬀers is monotonically decreased.
We now analyze the case of weak mutation rate. As in the adaptive dynamics model,
mutations occur rarely, so that a mutant will either vanish or has taken over the popu-
2This statement is also true if x1 > y2. In this case, the proposer wants to decrease his oﬀer from x1
to x2 and the responder wants to increase his acceptance level from x2 to x1.
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Figure 3.2.2: An example for the learning-mutation process in a population of four players
from generation T to generation T + 1. In generation T , three players adopt S(0.1, 0.1)
and one adopts a mutant strategy S(0.1, 0.4). At the beginning, they are divided into two
mini ultimatum games, UG(S(0.1, 0.1), S(0.1, 0.1)) and UG(S(0.1, 0.1), S(0.1, 0.4)), and
update their strategies by the quantal response learning (P means proposers and R means
responders). In the ﬁrst group, players will not change their original strategies, while in
the second group, the proposer will change the strategy to S(0.4, 0.1) since 0.4 dominates
0.1. Mutations happen after all the pairs reach Nash equilibria. The responder in the
ﬁrst pair mutates to S(0.5, 0.1) (the red number). As a result of learning and mutation,
strategies in generation T + 1 are S(0.1, 0.1), S(0.5, 0.1), S(0.4, 0.1) and S(0.1, 0.4).
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lation before the next mutation arises (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Geritz et al., 1998).
For simplicity, we represent the strategy of the residents by R(x) = S(x, x). Eq.(3.2.3)
indicates that (a) if R(x) < h∗, the population could only be replaced by mutants using
oﬀer higher than R(x), (b) if h∗ ≤ R(x) < 1
2
, both higher and lower oﬀers may invade,
(c) if 1
2
≤ R(x), any lower oﬀer could take over the population (See Figure 3.2.1). Gen-
erally speaking, the learning-mutation process leads to oscillations in the interval [h∗, 1
2
),
where proposers oﬀer 40 to 50 percent of the total sum to responders and responders
reject oﬀers below their expectation with probability one half. Once the resident strategy
leaves the interval, learning and mutation will push it back. If we further assume that the
mutational jumps are very small such that the resident strategy changes continuously, it
is easy to verify that dR(x)
dt
> 0 if R(x) < 1
2
but dR(x)
dt
< 0 if R(x) ≥ 1
2
. R(x) = 1
2
is a
degenerate point of the adaptive dynamics, i.e., the resident strategy will decrease when
near the fair oﬀer.
Numerical simulations suggest that theoretical predictions of the weak mutation rate
case could also be applied to describe the high mutation rate case, where the population
has a high diversity of strategies. That is, the population mean oﬀer and the mean
acceptance level are nearly the same, and the mean oﬀer increases if it is smaller than 0.4
but oscillates if it is between 0.4 to 0.5. Moreover, if the mutational jumps are very small,
the mean oﬀer converges to a interval very close to the fair oﬀer. (See Figure 3.2.3)
3.3 Discussion
In the model, players have no information about the mini ultimatum game (i.e., λ = 0)
at the beginning of each new interaction, no matter how many interactions they have
played. The motivation is twofold. On the one hand, each player faces a new game in
a new interaction since his opponent is anonymous and the payoﬀ matrix of the mini
ultimatum game depends on the strategies of both players. On the other hand, empirical
evidences from repeated PD games (with punishment) 3 support this consideration. The
frequency of cooperation in the initial round of each interaction is nearly the same and
decreases over the rounds (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Kagel and Roth, 1995; Dreber et
al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). We can then expect that players have zero information before
each interaction and evolve entirely by social learning.
We consider that players are boundedly rational and choose the best response accord-
ing to noisy observations. In each group, two players update their strategies simultane-
ously. At the beginning, the proposer is inclined to make the high oﬀer due to the high
3The payoﬀ matrix of the PD game is equivalent to that of the mini dictator game, which is a variation
of the mini ultimatum game where responders are not allowed to reject. Selten and Stoecker (1986) and
Kagel and Roth (1995) summarized the results on repeated PD games. Dreber et al. (2008) and Wu et
al. (2009) are two recent studies on repeated PD games with punishment.
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Figure 3.2.3: Time evolution of the population mean oﬀer. The population size is 100 and
evolves under the learning-mutation process. At the end of each generation, players adopt
a new oﬀer with probability 0.1. The mutational jumps follow the normal distribution,
where variances in Figures (a) and (b) are 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. (a) The population
mean oﬀer increases if it is smaller than 0.4 but oscillates if it is between 0.4 to 0.5. (b)
If the mutational jumps are very small, the mean oﬀer converges to a interval very close
to the fair oﬀer.
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rejection rate and the responder tends to accept the lower oﬀer since rejecting is costly.
The observation errors decrease as the game progresses and two players will ﬁnally reach
a Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, their strategies converge to the high oﬀer if the proposer
learns faster than the responder, i.e., the proposer stops making the low oﬀer before the
responder stops rejecting. This happens when the low oﬀer is small, which means the
rejection of the low oﬀer causes a greater loss to the proposer than to the responder.
Thus, mistakes in evaluating the payoﬀ functions lead to fairer solutions.
The emergence of equity is as complicated as the evolution of human society. Our
model excluded many important issues, such as preference on fairness (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or on punishment (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006), communication or information before an interaction (Levine,
1998; Nowak et al, 2000; Sigmund et al., 2001) and social networks (Page et al., 2000;
Jong et al., 2008). Based on learning and mutation, we show that individuals entirely
motivated by self interests can evolve toward fairness in the population.
Chapter 4
Equilibrium selections via replicator
dynamics
Abstract
This chapter studies two equilibrium selection methods based on the replicator dynamics.
A Nash equilibrium is called centroid dominant if the trajectory of the replicator dynamics
starting at the centroid of the strategy simplex converges to it. On the other hand,
an equilibrium is called basin dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction. Two
concepts are compared with the risk dominant equilibrium in the context of 2×2 bimatrix
coordination games. Main results include (a) if a Nash equilibrium is both risk dominant
and centroid dominant, it must have the largest basin of attraction, (b) the basin dominant
equilibrium must be either risk dominant or centroid dominant.
Key words
Equilibrium selection; replicator dynamics; risk dominance; basins of attraction
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4.1 Introduction
One well known dynamic approach in evolutionary game theory is the replicator dynamics
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Replica-
tor dynamics was ﬁrst motivated biologically in the context of evolution (Maynard Smith,
1982; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). Later, economists related this to learning and deﬁned
several equilibrium notions (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992;
Gale et al., 1995; Weibull, 1995; Binmore and Samuelson, 1997; Samuelson, 1997; Borgers
and Sarin, 1997; Schlag, 1998; Cabrales, 2000; Imhof, 2005; Hilbe, 2010). These re-
searches usually consider modiﬁed replicator dynamics that incorporate stochastic eﬀects
such as errors, mutations or ﬁnite populations. In this chapter, we study two equilibrium
selections based on the canonical replicator dynamics.
The ﬁrst is a homotopy approach by tracing the trajectory of the replicator dynamics
starting at the centroid. For 2×2 coordination games (both symmetric games and bimatrix
games), the trajectory approaches a unique Nash equilibrium as t → ∞ (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). This then deﬁnes a unique equilibrium selection from the set of Nash
equilibria. We call this equilibrium the centroid dominant equilibrium of the game. A
biological intuition is that natural selection leads to the centroid dominant equilibrium if
each phenotype in the population has equal frequency. From the perspective of learning,
if players choose their initial strategies randomly and imitate actions that perform better
with a probability proportional to the expected payoﬀ, the population will converge to
the centroid dominant equilibrium.
The second method is to select a Nash equilibrium from the set of asymptotically
stable equilibria of the replicator dynamics by comparing their basins of attraction. A
Nash equilibrium is called basin dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction. This
implies that a population with uncertain initial state is more likely to converge to the
dominant equilibrium under the replicator dynamics.
For 2 × 2 symmetric coordination games, one can easily verify that the center point
is attracted by the risk dominant equilibrium. Hence, the risk dominant equilibrium is
both centroid dominant and basin dominant. In fact, in 2× 2 symmetric games, most of
the equilibrium notions we mentioned above choose the risk dominant equilibrium (as an
exception, Binmore and Samuelson, 1997), but they usually select diﬀerent equilibria in
more general situations (Kim, 1996; Samuelson, 2002).
In this chapter, we focus on 2 × 2 bimatrix coordination games. Section 4.2 reviews
the risk dominant equilibrium and the replicator dynamics. Section 4.3 studies the cen-
troid dominance and derives an explicit formula for the centroid dominant equilibrium.
Section 4.4 investigates the basin dominant equilibrium and shows some properties. Sec-
tion 4.5 compares the three equilibrium notions and looks for their relations. Section 4.6
summarizes the main results and suggests some further developments.
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4.2 Bimatrix games
Consider a 2× 2 bimatrix game, where the two pure strategies of players in population A
(call them player A) are A1 and A2, and two pure strategies of players in population B
(call them player B) are B1 and B2. Let aij denotes the payoﬀ to player A using strategy
Ai when it meets player B using strategy Bj, and denote the payoﬀ to player B in this
interaction by bji. The payoﬀ matrix is then written as
B1 B2
A1
A2
(
a11, b11 a12, b21
a21, b12 a22, b22
)
(4.2.1)
The bimatrix game is called a coordination game if pure strategy pairs (A1, B1) and (A2,
B2) are both strict Nash equilibria. That is, a11 − a21 > 0 and a22 − a12 > 0 for player A,
and b11− b21 > 0 and b22− b12 > 0 for player B. Besides of two strict Nash equilibria, the
game also has a mixed equilibrium (p, q), where p = b22−b12
b11+b22−b21−b12 and q =
a22−a12
a11+a22−a21−a12 .
As introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), for the 2×2 coordination game, (A1, B1)
is said to risk dominate (A2, B2) if the Nash products satisfy
(a11 − a21)(b11 − b21) > (a22 − a12)(b22 − b12) (4.2.2)
Deﬁne LRD : p + q = 1. Hence, (A1, B1) is risk dominant (RD) if and only if (p, q) is
below the line LRD on p− q plane.
Denote the frequency of strategy A1 in A players’ population and strategy B1 in B
players’ population by x and y, respectively. The replicator dynamics for the bimatrix
game Eq.(4.2.1) is
dx
dt
= x(1− x)((a12 − a22)(1− y) + (a11 − a21)y)
dy
dt
= y(1− y)((b12 − b22)(1− x) + (b11 − b21)x) (4.2.3)
Eq.(4.2.3) could be normalized as
dx
dt
= x(1− x)(y − q)
dy
dt
= cy(1− y)(x− p) (4.2.4)
, where (p, q) is the mixed equilibrium and c = b11+b22−b21−b12
a11+a22−a21−a12 > 0.
It is easy to see that Eq.(4.2.4) has four boundary equilibria, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and
(1, 1), and one interior equilibrium, (p, q). For their stabilities, (0, 0) and (1, 1) are lo-
cally asymptotically stable that correspond to the two strict Nash equilibria (A2, B2) and
(A1, B1), (1, 0) and (0, 1) are unstable, and the mixed equilibrium (p, q) is a saddle point
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
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4.3 Centroid dominance
For 2 × 2 bimatrix coordination games, solutions of Eq.(4.2.4) includes a unique path
starting for t = 0 at the centroid (1
2
, 1
2
) and converging to an Nash equilibrium as t → ∞
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). This implies that we can deﬁne a unique selection from the
set of Nash equilibria by tracing the trajectory of the replicator dynamics. An equilibrium
is called centroid dominant (CD) if and only if the solution of Eq.(4.2.4) with initial value
at the centroid converges to it.
For convenience, denote the basins of attraction of two stable equilibria (0, 0) and
(1, 1) by S0 and S1, respectively. This means that trajectories of Eq.(4.2.4) with initial
points in region S0 converge to (0, 0) and with initial points in region S1 converge to (1, 1).
However, if a initial point is on the curve separating S0 and S1 (we call this curve the
separatrix ), the trajectory goes to neither (0, 0) nor (1, 1) but to the mixed equilibrium
(p, q). Hence, (0, 0) is CD if and only if (1
2
, 1
2
) ∈ S0 and (1, 1) is CD if and only (12 , 12) ∈ S1.
In another word, which equilibrium is selected is decided by the position of the separatrix,
i.e., if it is above the centroid, (0, 0) is CD, and if it is below the centroid, (1, 1) is CD.
(See Figure 4.3.1)
Therefore, we turn our attention to the separatrix in the rest of this section. For given
(p, q, c), denote the separatrix by
L(p,q,c) : y = l(p,q,c)(x). (4.3.1)
Intuitively, L(p,q,c) consists of two trajectories of Eq.(4.2.4), where one from (1, 0) to (p, q)
and another from (0, 1) to (p, q), i.e., points on L(p,q,c) satisfy
dx
dy
=
x(1− x)(y − q)
cy(1− y)(x− p) (4.3.2)
This implies that l(p,q,c)(x) is monotonically decreasing in x and (x− p)(y − q) ≤ 0.
Let us now derive an expression of the separatrix. From Eq.(4.3.2),
(1− x)c(1−p)xcp = K(1− y)1−qyq (4.3.3)
where K is a constant depending on the initial point. Notice that the separatrix passes
through (p, q),
(
1− x
1− p )
c(1−p)(
x
p
)cp = (
1− y
1− q )
1−q(
y
q
)q (4.3.4)
For convenience, deﬁne
F(p,q,c)(x, y) = (
1− x
1− p )
c(1−p)(
x
p
)cp − (1− y
1− q )
1−q(
y
q
)q (4.3.5)
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Figure 4.3.1: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics. Parameters are taken as p =
0.3, q = 0.6, c = 0.5 in Figure (a) and c = 0.1 in Figure (b). Black points are the
mixed equilibrium (0.3, 0.6), blue curves are the separatrices, and yellow curves are the
trajectories of the replicator dynamics with initial value (1
2
, 1
2
). (1, 1) is RD but CD
equilibrium and BD equilibrium depend crucially on c. In Figure (a), (1, 1) is CD and
BD, and in Figure (b), (0, 0) is CD and BD.
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It is clearly that F(p,q,c) = 0 for each point on L(p,q,c), but we need to be careful that not
all solutions of F(p,q,c) = 0 are on L(p,q,c), e.g., pure strategy equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1).
A point (x, y) is on the separatrix if and only if both conditions F(p,q,c)(x, y) = 0 and
(x− p)(y − q) ≤ 0 hold.
For separatrices with diﬀerent (p, q, c), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1
(a) l(p,q,c)(x) > l(pˆ,q,c)(x) if and only if pˆ < p. (b) l(p,q,c)(x) > l(p,qˆ,c)(x) if and only if
qˆ < q.
Proof:
(a) Notice that (p, q) and (pˆ, q) are on L(p,q,c) and L(pˆ,q,c), respectively, we only need
to show that L(p,q,c) and L(pˆ,q,c) have no intersection in (0, 1)× (0, 1).
For any (x, y),
F(p,q,c)(x, y)− F(pˆ,q,c)(x, y) = F(p,q,c)(x, 0)− F(pˆ,q,c)(x, 0) (4.3.6)
, where F(p,q,c)(0, 0) = F(p,q,c)(1, 0) = F(pˆ,q,c)(0, 0) = F(pˆ,q,c)(1, 0) = 0. Notice that
d(lnF(p,q,c)(x, 0)− lnF(pˆ,q,c)(x, 0))
dx
= c
(p− pˆ)(1− 2x)
x(1− x) (4.3.7)
, F(pˆ,q,c)(x, 0)−F(p,q,c)(x, 0) = 0 for 0 < x < 1. This implies that F(p,q,c)(x, y) = F(pˆ,q,c)(x, y)
for 0 < x < 1, i.e., L(p,q,c) and L(pˆ,q,c) have no intersection.
The proof of (b) is similar. 
From Lemma 4.1, we obtain Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1
For any given c, the mixed equilibrium (p, q) is CD if and only if (p, q) satisﬁes
F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) = 0, where (1
2
− p)(1
2
− q) ≤ 0. This deﬁnes a curve on p − q plane, de-
note it by LCD. (0, 0) is CD if and only if (p, q) is above LCD and (1, 1) is CD if and only
if (p, q) is below LCD.
Proof:
The mixed equilibrium (p, q) is CD if and only if (1
2
, 1
2
) is on the separatrix, i.e.,
F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) = 0 and (1
2
− p)(1
2
− q) ≤ 0.
Lemma 4.1 indicates that for given (p, q, c), if (1
2
, 1
2
) is attracted by (0, 0), (1
2
, 1
2
) is also
attracted by (0, 0) for (p, qˆ, c), where qˆ > q. This implies the second part of the theorem. 
CHAPTER 4. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 71
In addition to Theorem 4.1, an explicit formula for deciding the pure strategy CD
equilibrium can be summarized as follows.
Corollary 4.1
Nash equilibrium (0, 0) is CD if (a) p > 1
2
and q > 1
2
, or (b) p < 1
2
, q > 1
2
and
F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) > 0, or (c) p > 1
2
, q < 1
2
and F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) < 0. Nash equilibrium (1, 1) is CD
if (d) p < 1
2
and q < 1
2
, or (e) p < 1
2
, q > 1
2
and F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) < 0, or (f) p > 1
2
, q < 1
2
and
F(p,q,c)(
1
2
, 1
2
) > 0.
Theorem 4.1 claims that p− q plane is divided into two regions by
LCD : (1− p)c(1−p)pcp = 21−c(1− q)1−qqq (4.3.8)
, where (p− 1
2
)(q− 1
2
) ≤ 0. By applying the implicit function theorem, several properties
of LCD can be veriﬁed easily.
Corollary 4.2
For any given c > 0, (a) LCD is monotonically decreasing in p− q plane; (b) (p, q) =
(1
2
, 1
2
) is on LCD and the slope at this point is −
√
c. (c) If c = 0, LCD is q =
1
2
; if c = 1,
LCD matches LRD : p+ q = 1; if c → ∞, LCD is p = 12 . (d) For c = 1, (12 , 12) is the only
intersection of LCD and LRD.
Corollary 4.2 points out that if c = 1, the trajectory of the replicator dynamics start-
ing at the centroid always converges to the RD equilibrium. Intuitively, c = 1 can be
understood as that payoﬀs for two types of players are equally weighted. However, LRD
and LCD are no longer identical for any c = 1. Figure 4.3.1 shows clearly that the CD
equilibrium depends crucially on c in contrast to the RD equilibrium.
4.4 Basin dominance
In this section, an equilibrium is considered dominant if and only if it has the largest
basin of attraction. To formulate this deﬁnition, let s0(p, q, c) and s1(p, q, c) denote the
sizes of the basins of attraction of (0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively. Using the notations in
previous sections, s0(p, q, c) can be calculated by the integral
s0(p, q, c) =
∫ 1
0
l(p,q,c)(x)dx. (4.4.1)
Hence, (0, 0) is basin dominant (BD) if and only if s0(p, q, c) >
1
2
and (1, 1) is BD if and
only if s0(p, q, c) <
1
2
.
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The main goal of this section is to ﬁnd a function f ∗, where q = f ∗(p, c), such that
s0(p, f
∗(p, c), c) = 1
2
. Theorem 4.2 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of f ∗.
Theorem 4.2
There exists a unique continuous function q = f ∗(p, c) such that s0(p, q, c) = 12 , where
it has following properties: (a) f ∗ is a decreasing function of p, (b) s0(p, q, c) > 12 if and
only if q > f ∗(p, c), (c) f ∗ is central symmetric, i.e., 1− q = f ∗(1− p, c).
Proof:
To show the existence and uniqueness of f ∗, it is enough to prove that s0(p, q, c) is
continuously increasing in q. From Eq.(4.4.1), s0(p, q, c) is continuously increasing in q if
the separatrix y = l(p,q,c)(x) is continuously increasing in q for any given p, c and x. From
Eq.(4.3.4), the continuity is obvious. To see the monotonicity, we calculate the derivative
of l(p,q,c)(x)
dy
dq
= −∂F(p,q,c)/∂q
∂F(p,q,c)/∂y
= −(1− y)
1−qyq
(1− q)1−qqq ln(1 +
y − q
(1− y)q )/
(q − y)(1− y)−qyq−1
(1− q)1−qqq
= y(1− y)
ln(1 + y−q
(1−y)q )
y − q > 0. (4.4.2)
This implies the existence and uniqueness of f ∗.
Since s0(p, q, c) is continuously increasing in q, property (b) is obvious. Similarly as
Eq.(4.4.2), it is easy to prove that l(p,q,c)(x) is continuously decreasing in p. This yields
property (a). Finally, property (c) is directly from the symmetry of L(p,q,c). 
Interestingly, Theorem 4.2 shows that CD equilibrium selection and BD equilibrium
selection have the similar structures. For convenience, denote the curve q = f ∗(p, c) by
LBD. For given c, properties (a) and (c) say that LBD is monotonically decreasing and
divides the p − q plane into two regions, where (0, 0) is selected for (p, q) in the upper
region and (1, 1) is selected for (p, q) in the lower region.
In general, deriving an explicit expression of f ∗ is very diﬃcult since Eq.(4.4.1) is
implicit. Alternatively, we calculate LBD for some special parameters. These results will
provide an intuition for LBD.
Firstly, we introduce a new notation. Denote the time derivatives for points on curve
L by D(L). For instance, on the separatrix L(p,q,c)
D(L(p,q,c)) =
d(F(p,q,c)(x, y))
dt
|L(p,q,c) (4.4.3)
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D(L) = 0 means that the solutions of the replicator dynamics with initial values on L go
away from it. Since the separatrix consists of two solutions, D(L(p,q,c)) = 0. On the other
hand, if a curve L satisﬁes D(L) = 0 and passes through three points (0, 1), (1, 0) and
(p, q), it must be the separatrix.
Theorem 4.3
(a) If c → 0, s0(p, q, c) > 12 if and only if q > 12 ; (b) if c = 1, s0(p, q, c) > 12 if and
only if p+ q > 1; (c) if c → ∞, s0(p, q, c) > 12 if and only if p > 12 .
Proof:
(a)If c → 0, Eq.(4.2.4) becomes
dx
dt
= x(1− x)(y − q)
dy
dt
→ 0 (4.4.4)
Clearly, the separatrix of S0 and S1 is L(p,q,c) : y = q . Thus, s0(p, q, c) >
1
2
if and only if
q > 1
2
.
(b)If c = 1, Eq.(4.2.4) could be written as
dx
dt
= x(1− x)(y − q)
dy
dt
= y(1− y)(x− p) (4.4.5)
Consider the time derivatives of L : x+ y = 1,
D(L) = x(1− x)(1− p− q) (4.4.6)
If p + q > 1, points on L are attracted by (0, 0) since D(L) < 0. This implies
s0(p, q, c) >
1
2
. Conversely, if p+ q < 1, L is attracted by (0, 0), which implies s0(p, q, c) <
1
2
. For the critical case p+ q = 1, we have D(L) = 0. Notice that L passes through (0, 1),
(1, 0) and (p, q), it is the separatrix of S0 and S1. Thus, we have s0(p, q, c) = s1(p, q, c) =
1
2
.
(c) The proof is similar to (a). 
Theorem 4.3 studies LBD for extreme values of c. From another angle, we next derive
LBD for p = q =
1
2
. In this case, Eq.(4.3.4) becomes
22c((1− x)x)c = 22(1− y)y (4.4.7)
Notice that the separatrix goes through (0, 1) and (1, 0), L(1/2,1/2,c) can be written down
explicitly
y =
{1+(1−22c(x(1−x))c)1/2
2
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
1−(1−22c(x(1−x))c)1/2
2
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1 (4.4.8)
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Thus, the size of the basin of attraction of (0, 0) is
s0(
1
2
,
1
2
, c) =
∫ 1/2
0
1 + (1− 22c(x(1− x))c)1/2
2
dx
+
∫ 1
1/2
1− (1− 22c(x(1− x))c)1/2
2
dx =
1
2
(4.4.9)
since ∫ 1/2
0
(1− 22c(x(1− x))c)1/2dx =
∫ 1
1/2
(1− 22c(x(1− x))c)1/2dx. (4.4.10)
This implies f ∗(1
2
, c) = 1
2
for any c.
As a conclusion, properties of LBD are summarized in Corollary 4.3.
Corollary 4.3
For any given c > 0, (a) LBD is monotonically decreasing in p − q plane; (b)
(p, q) = (1
2
, 1
2
) is on LBD and the slope at this point is −
√
c. (c) If c = 0, LBD is
q = 1
2
; if c = 1, LBD matches LRD : p + q = 1; if c → ∞, LBD is p = 12 . (d) For c = 1,
(1
2
, 1
2
) is the only intersection of LBD and LRD.
Properties (a) and (c) are obtained directly from Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, and
we leave the proofs of properties (b) and (d) in Appendix A.1.
Corollary 4.3 implies that RD equilibrium does not always have the largest basin of
attraction in 2× 2 bimatrix games. If compares Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 4.3, one can
ﬁnd that LCD and LBD have very similar properties. However, since the BD equilibrium
does not have an explicit formula, relation between LCD and LBD is still unclear.
4.5 Relations among diﬀerent notions
Previous sections discuss the relation between LRD and LCD and the relation between
LRD and LBD. In this section, we are going to link the three equilibrium notions.
Theorem 4.4
For any given c, LBD is between LRD and LCD. (See the proof in Appendix A.2)
Corollary 4.4
(a) A strategy that is both RD and CD must be BD. (b) The BD strategy must be either
RD or CD.
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Figure 4.5.1: Relations between RD, CD and BD. Parameters are taken as c = 0.5 in
Figure (a) and c = 0.1 in Figure (b). Black line, blue curve and red points are LRD, LCD
and LBD, respectively. LBD is between LRD and LCD and is very close to LCD.
As a complement of Corollary 4.3, Corollary 4.4 provides an alternative way for ﬁnding
the BD strategy. When facing a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, we can ﬁrst calculate the RD
equilibrium and CD equilibrium. If two methods point to the same equilibrium, it must
be also BD. However, the thought does not work if two methods choose diﬀerent equilibria.
Numerical simulations suggest that LBD is very close to LCD. (See Figure 4.5.1) Therefore,
if RD strategy and CD strategy are diﬀerent, the CD strategy is more likely to have the
largest basin of attraction.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we studies two equilibrium notions, centroid dominance and basin domi-
nance, based on the canonical replicator dynamics. A Nash equilibrium is called centroid
dominant if the centroid of the strategy simplex is in its basin of attraction. This predicts
that in a population where individuals choose their initial strategies randomly, replicator
dynamics converge to the centroid dominant equilibrium. On the other hand, a Nash
equilibrium is called basin dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction. Following
this concept, a population with uncertain initial state has larger probability to evolve to
the basin dominant equilibrium.
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We then compare them with the risk dominant equilibrium. For 2× 2 bimatrix coor-
dination games, three methods have similar structures. For given c, each of them yields
a curve separating p− q plane and the equilibrium equilibrium is decided by the relative
position of (p, q) and the curve, i.e., (0, 0) is dominant if (p, q) is above the curve and
(1, 1) is dominant if (p, q) is below the curve.
For these curves, LRD is a line with slope −1 but the shapes of LCD and LBD depend
crucially on c. If c = 1, three curves are identical, which implies that the three meth-
ods choose the same Nash equilibrium. More precisely, the trajectory of the replicator
dynamics starting at the centroid converges to the risk dominant equilibrium, and this
equilibrium also has the largest basin of attraction. If c = 1, three methods are no longer
equivalent. In this case, the risk dominant equilibrium is not always preferred.
Centroid dominant equilibrium can be calculated by Corollary 4.1, but there is no
explicit formula for the basin dominant equilibrium. We only know that the curves of two
methods have very similar properties. For instance, LBD and LCD are all monotonically
decreasing in p− q plane and the slopes at (1
2
, 1
2
) are both −√c.
Instead of deriving the explicit expression, Theorem 4.4 provides an alternative way
for ﬁnding the basin dominant strategy by comparing the curves of diﬀerent methods.
It claims that LBD is always between LRD and LCD. Hence, if a strategy is both risk
dominant and centroid dominant, it must has the largest basin of attraction. However, if
the risk dominant equilibrium and centroid dominant equilibrium are diﬀerent, numerical
simulation suggests that the centroid dominant strategy is more likely to have the largest
basin of attraction.
As an extension, centroid dominance and basin dominance are also well deﬁned for
3 × 3 symmetric coordination games. In these games, Zeeman (1980; see also Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998) showed that trajectories of the replicator dynamics converge to Nash
equilibria, and all mixed Nash equilibria are unstable. However, we can not expect a
simple formula to decide which equilibrium is selected even for the centroid dominance
because the solutions of 3-strategy replicator dynamics do not always have explicit ex-
pressions. For further studies, a starting point is coordination games with diagonal payoﬀ
matrix. Intuitively, the payoﬀ dominant strategy must be both centroid dominant and
basin dominant. Another development is to compare the center and basin dominance
equilibria under diﬀerent evolutionary/learning dynamics. It is well known that a strict
Nash equilibrium usually has diﬀerent basins of attraction under the replicator dynamics
and the best response dynamics. In particular, Golman and Page (2010) constructed a
class of 3 × 3 symmetric games for which the overlap in the two basins of attraction is
arbitrarily small. This implies that best response dynamics lead to a diﬀerent equilibrium
than replicator dynamics almost always.
As an extension, centroid dominance and basin dominance are also well deﬁned for
3 × 3 symmetric coordination games. In these games, Zeeman (1980; see also Hofbauer
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and Sigmund, 1998) showed that trajectories of the replicator dynamics converge to Nash
equilibria, and all mixed Nash equilibria are unstable. However, we can not expect a
simple formula to decide which equilibrium is selected even for the centroid dominance
since the solutions of 3-strategy replicator dynamics do not always have explicit expres-
sions. For further studies, a starting point is coordination games with diagonal payoﬀ
matrix. Intuitively, the payoﬀ dominant strategy must be both centroid dominant and
basin dominant. Another development is to study the relations between basin dominance
and other equilibrium notions. In 3× 3 symmetric games, a strict Nash equilibrium usu-
ally has diﬀerent basins of attraction under the replicator dynamics and the best response
dynamics. In particular, Golman and Page (2010) constructed a class of 3× 3 symmetric
games for which the overlap in the two basins of attraction is arbitrarily small.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Corollary 4.3
Proof of Corollary 4.3 (b)
For any given c > 0, (p, q) = (1
2
, 1
2
) is on LBD and the slope at this point is −
√
c.
Proof
Eq.(4.4.9) shows that (p, q) = (1
2
, 1
2
) is on LBD for any c > 0. Let us now calculate the
slope at this point.
For (p, q) close to (1
2
, 1
2
) and (x, y) on L(1/2,1/2,c), we have
s0(p, q, c)− 1
2
=
∫ 1
0
(l(p,q,c)(x)− l(1/2,1/2,c)(x))dx
=
∫ 1
0
((p− 1
2
)
∂l(p,q,c)(x)
∂p
|(p,q)=( 1
2
, 1
2
) + (q −
1
2
)
∂l(p,q,c)(x)
∂q
|(p,q)=( 1
2
, 1
2
))dx
= −
∫ 1
0
((p− 1
2
)
∂F(p,q,c)/∂p
∂F(p,q,c)/∂y
|(p,q)=( 1
2
, 1
2
) + (q −
1
2
)
∂F(p,q,c)/∂q
∂F(p,q,c)/∂y
|(p,q)=( 1
2
, 1
2
))dx
= −
∫ 1
0
22c−2(x(1− x))c
y − 1/2 (c(p−
1
2
) ln(
x
1− x)− (q −
1
2
) ln(
y
1− y ))dx (A.1.1)
If (p, q) is on the tangent of LBD, i.e.,
q − 1
2
=
∂f ∗(p, c)
∂p
|(p,q)=( 1
2
, 1
2
)(p−
1
2
) (A.1.2)
, Eq.(A.1.1) should not include ﬁrst-order term of p.
For convenience, deﬁne ln( x
1−x) = e(x). The Taylor expansion of y = l(1/2,1/2,c)(x) at
e = 0 is
y =
1
2
+
√
c
4
e+ o(e)3 (A.1.3)
78
CHAPTER 4. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 79
Hence,
ln(
y
1− y ) = 4(y −
1
2
) + o(y − 1
2
)3 =
√
ce+ o(e)3 (A.1.4)
Eq.(A.1.1) is then simpliﬁed as
−
∫ 1
0
22c(x(1− x))c(√c(p− 1
2
) + q − 1
2
+ o(e2))dx (A.1.5)
In order to eliminate the ﬁrst-order term of (p− 1
2
), we need
√
c(p− 1
2
) + q− 1
2
= 0. This
implies that the slope of LBD at (
1
2
, 1
2
) is −√c. 
Proof of Corollary 4.3 (d)
For given c = 1, (1
2
, 1
2
) is the only intersection of LBD and LRD.
Proof
Without loss of generality, suppose that 0 < c < 1 and p < 1
2
. For p+ q = 1, consider
the derivatives of L(1/2,1/2,c)
D(L(1/2,1/2,c)) = c(x(1− x))c(p− q)(1− x− y) (A.1.6)
Notice that points on L(1/2,1/2,c) satisfy
4(y − x)(1− x− y) = (1− 2x)2 − (2y − 1)2
= (22(x(1− x)))c − 22(x(1− x)) > 0 (A.1.7)
, this implies that 1 − x − y > 0 if x < y and 1 − x − y < 0 if y < x. Thus, trajec-
tories of Eq.(4.2.4) with initial points on L(1/2,1/2,c) are always attracted by (0, 0) since
D(L(1/2,1/2,c)) < 0 in region (0,
1
2
)× (1
2
, 1) and D(L(1/2,1/2,c)) > 0 in region (
1
2
, 0)× (0, 1
2
).
Thus, s0(p, q, c) >
1
2
. From Theorem 4.2, LBD is below LRD for 0 < c < 1 and p <
1
2
.
Similarly, LBD is above LRD for 0 < c < 1 and
1
2
< p. Therefore, (1
2
, 1
2
) is the only
intersection of LBD and LRD. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof of Theorem 4.4
For any given c, LBD is between LRD and LCD.
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Proof
Without loss of generality, suppose 0 < c < 1 and p < 1
2
. In this case, Corollary 4.2
indicates that LCD is below LRD. Hence, we have to prove: (i) LBD is below LRD and (ii)
LBD is above LCD.
(i) can be obtained directly from property (d) of Corollary 4.3 (see also Appendix
A.1) but the proof of (ii) is more complicated. Our basic idea is to calculate s0(p, q, c)
for (p, q, c) on LCD (denote by s0(LCD) for simplicity). From Theorem 4.2, LBD is above
LCD if s0(LCD) <
1
2
.
The proof consists of three parts: (a) LCD is below L(1/2,1/2,c)(p, q) if 0 < c < 1 and
p < 1
2
, where L(1/2,1/2,c)(p, q) denotes the separatrix L(1/2,1/2,c) on p− q plane (i.e., replace
x and y by p and q, respectively), (b) LLCD is below L(1/2,1/2,c) if 0 < x <
1
2
, where LLCD
denotes the separatrix L(p,q,c) with (p, q, c) on LCD, and (c) s0(LCD) <
1
2
.
(a) From Corollary 4.2, p < 1 − q < 1
2
for points on both curves. For convenience,
denote the expressions of L(1/2,1/2,c)(p, q) and LCD by q1 = l(1/2,1/2,c)(p) and q2 = lCD(p),
respectively. Clearly, p = q = 1
2
is an intersection.
We now investigate the existence of intersection in region p < 1−q < 1
2
. In this region,
slopes of two curves are
dq1
dp
= c
q1(1− q1)(1− 2p)
p(1− p)(1− 2q1) < 0
dq2
dp
= c
ln p− ln(1− p)
ln q2 − ln(1− q2) < 0 (A.2.1)
, where at p = q = 1
2
, both of them equal to 1
2
.
For p < 1− q < 1
2
,
q(1− q)(1− 2p)
p(1− p)(1− 2q) <
ln p− ln(1− p)
ln q − ln(1− q) (A.2.2)
since
d(p(1−p)
1−2p (ln p− ln(1− p)))
dp
=
(ln p− ln(1− p))(p2 + (1− p)2) + 1− 2p
(1− 2p)2 (A.2.3)
and
d((ln p− ln(1− p))(p2 + (1− p)2) + 1− 2p)
dp
=
(1− 2p)2
p(1− p) − 2(1− 2p)(ln p− ln(1− p)) > 0 (A.2.4)
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From Eq.(A.2.2), we have q1 > q2 >
1
2
for p → 1
2
−
. To see this, consider the linear
approximations of q1 and q2 near (
1
2
, 1
2
),
q1 =
1
2
+ (p− 1
2
)
dq1
dp
q2 =
1
2
+ (p− 1
2
)
dq2
dp
(A.2.5)
If q2 > q1 >
1
2
,
dq1
dp
=
q1(1− q1)(1− 2p)
p(1− p)(1− 2q1) <
ln p− ln(1− p)
ln q1 − ln(1− q1) <
ln p− ln(1− p)
ln q2 − ln(1− q2) =
dq2
dp
(A.2.6)
which contradicts Eq.(A.2.5).
On the other hand, Eq.(A.2.2) also implies that dq1
dp
< dq2
dp
at all possible intersections.
Therefore, L(1/2,1/2,c)(p, q) and LCD can not meet each other in region p < 1− q < 12 .
Notice that lCD(0) < 1 = l(1/2,1/2,c)(0), LCD is below L(1/2,1/2,c)(p, q) if 0 < c < 1 and
p < 1
2
.
(b) From part (a), we only need to show that LLCD and L(1/2,1/2,c) have no intersection
in region 0 < x < 1
2
.
Suppose that (x, y) is an intersection, the slopes of two curves at (x, y) are then given
by kLLCD (x, y) =
x(1−x)(y−q)
cy(1−y)(x−p) and kL(1/2,1/2,c)(x, y) =
x(1−x)(y−1/2)
cy(1−y)(x−1/2) , respectively.
Since the separatrix is decreasing, (x, y) is either in region 0 < x < p or 1
2
< y < q. If
0 < x < p, we have kLLCD (x, y) < kL(1/2,1/2,c)(x, y) < 0 since (p, q, c) is below L(1/2,1/2,c).
Notice that boundary point (0, 1) is on both curves, two curves have no intersection in
region 0 < x < p. Similarly, if 1
2
< y < q, we have 0 > kLCD(x, y) > kL(1/2,1/2,c)(x, y).
Notice that (1
2
, 1
2
) is on both curves, they also have no intersection in region 1
2
< y < q.
Therefore, LLCD is below L(1/2,1/2,c) if 0 < x <
1
2
.
(c) From part (b), we have F(1/2,1/2,c)(x, y) = 2
2c((1− x)x)c − 22(1− y)y < 0 for (x, y)
on LLCD . Notice that (x, y) satisﬁes FLCD(x, y) = 2
c(1− x)c(1−p)xcp − 2(1− y)1−qyq = 0,
this yields FLCD(1− x, 1− y) = 2cxc(1−p)(1− x)cp − 2y1−q(1− y)q < 0, which implies that
lLCD(x) + lLCD(1− x) < 1 if x < 12 .
Thus,
s0(LCD) =
∫ 1/2
0
lLCD(x)dx+
∫ 1
1/2
lLCD(x)dx
=
∫ 1/2
0
lLCD(x)dx+
∫ 1/2
0
lLCD(1− x)dx <
1
2
(A.2.7)
Finally, from Theorem 4.2, LBD is above LCD. 
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Chapter 5
The evolution of sanctioning
institutions: An experimental
approach to the social contract
Abstract
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that
the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enter-
prises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order
free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a public good which can be exploited.
Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose ﬁnes on
those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called
pool punishment. In this scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engag-
ing in the public good game, and without knowing who the free-riders will be. Theoretical
investigations have shown that peer punishment is more eﬃcient, but pool punishment
more stable. Social learning should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed
on second-order free-riders, but to peer punishment if they are not. Here we describe
an economic experiment which tests this prediction. We ﬁnd that pool punishment only
emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable
than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a sponta-
neously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free
rider problem.
Key words
Public goods game; experiments; collective action; punishment; institution; social learning
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5.1 Introduction
Coercion plays an essential role in overcoming social dilemmas. The corresponding line
of reasoning goes back at least as far as Hobbes’ ’Leviathan’ from 1651, and the practical
implementation can be traced throughout history. The selﬁsh motivations endangering
collective actions have to be suppressed by positive and negative incentives (Olson 1965;
Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Andreoni et al., 2003; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). In
particular, the threat of punishment curbs the temptation to free-ride, i.e., to exploit the
contributions of others without oﬀering an adequate return.
Institutions can be viewed as tools for providing incentives (Ostrom, 2005). It has been
shown that even in small-scale societies far removed from ’Leviathan’-like states, grass-
root institutions can deal, often eﬃciently, with the tasks of monitoring joint eﬀorts and
sanctioning defectors (Ostrom, 1990; Henrich, 2006; Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011).
The role of punishment in boosting cooperation is one of the best studied topics in
experimental economy. However, most investigations deal with so-called peer-punishment
(see, e.g., Fehr and G?chter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Casari, 2005; Fowler,
2005; G?chter et al., 2008; Hermann et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2007;
Dreber at al., 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Chaudhuri, 2011). Typically, the players in a
public good game are allowed to impose ﬁnes on exploiters, at a cost to themselves. The
threat of punishment can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation in the
collective action. Many players are willing (and frequently even eager) to shoulder the
costs of imposing ﬁnes on cheaters.
In most aspects of everyday life, the task of punishing exploiters has eventually been
taken over by institutions (Ostrom, 2005; Guillen et al., 2006). This is remarkable,
given the wide-spread tendency for moralistic aggression. In developed societies, peer-
punishment is not only obsolete, but even explicitly forbidden. Under conditions of anar-
chy, individuals have to take punishment into their own hands, but in all better-regulated
communities, punishment is delegated to institutions. How can we envisage this important
step in social development?
Evidently, this question can be approached from many diﬀerent angles. Here, we
use an economic experiment to test how individuals who want to coerce their group to
cooperate decide between inﬂicting punishment directly or using the intermediary of an
institution. The foremost problem, in such an experiment, is how to implement the
sanctioning institution (Tyler and Degoey, 1995; Casari and Luini, 2009; Kosfeld et al.,
2009; Andreoni and Gee, 2011). Which is the essential feature distinguishing institutional
from peer-punishment? Some argue that it is the delegation of punishment. However,
individuals who want to exert personal revenge can recur to ’hiring a gun’, and this would
still count as peer-punishment (Van Vugt et al., 2009). A more pronounced diﬀerence is
that sanctioning institutions are established in advance, and thus entail running costs
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even in the case that no one commits a punishable oﬀense. A county would have to pay
its sheriﬀ even if nobody commits a crime. We tried to model this as ’pool-punishment’
(Yamagishi, 1986; Sigmund et al, 2010, 2011; Kamei et al., 2011; Markussen et al., 2011;
Traulsen et al., 2012). Players who want to use such a sanctioning tool have to pay a fee,
even before the public good interaction takes place, or at least before they are informed
of its outcome, and thus before they know whether there will be any exploiters to punish.
Pool punishers can be viewed as paying a tax towards a police. We note that instead of
pool- or peer-punishment, some authors use the terms ’formal’ and ’informal’ sanctions
(Kamei et al., 2011; Markussen et al., 2011).
In our experiment, we investigated small groups, or ’toy-communities’, of 12 to 14
players. Each such group played 50 rounds of a public good game. Within each group,
players could decide, before each round, whether to join a public good game (A) without
punishment, (B) with peer-punishment, (C) with pool-punishment or (D) not to partic-
ipate. These games were played separately, i.e., the outcome of one game did not aﬀect
the outcomes of the other games in the group. Players were anonymous, and prevented
from communicating. Usually, both features do not hold under realistic conditions, but
we imposed them in order to focus on the alternative choices in punishment mechanisms.
All that players learned, after each round, was how many opted, in their group, for each
game, and which payoﬀ they obtained. They then could choose whether to opt for (A),
(B), (C) or (D) in the next round. We thus observed, in each toy community, whether
social learning led to institutional punishment or not.
It is clear that if punishment works, i.e., if it leads to all-out cooperation, then peer-
punishment is more eﬃcient than pool-punishment, since it entails no running costs.
However, theoretical considerations (Sigmund et al. 2010, see relevant theory in Appendix
B.1) imply that pool-punishment is more stable, provided that it is also directed at those
participants in the game who do not contribute to the punishment pool. Indeed, if
cooperation is achieved, i.e., if no one needs to be punished, then a peer-punisher cannot
be distinguished from a non-punisher. This means that second-order free-riders (deﬁned
as those who contribute to the public good, but not to the sanctions) cannot be spotted,
and thus cannot be punished. By contrast, those who do not contribute to the punishment
pool are just as visible as those who do not contribute to the public good, and can be
punished just as well. A system implementing this is highly immune against exploitation,
but requires payment of a tax.
In our experiment, a clear majority chose peer punishment in the ﬁrst round. Most
players switched to pool punishment in later rounds, but (as predicted) only if punishment
was also imposed on second-order free-riders. The experiment involved 238 ﬁrst-year stu-
dents from universities in Vienna. Interactions were anonymous. Players were randomly
allocated to 18 groups of 12 to 14 players each, for the duration of 50 rounds. We imple-
mented 2 treatments with 9 groups each: in the ’second-order treatment’, players were
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oﬀered a pool punishment which sanctioned second-order free riders, and in the ’ﬁrst-
order treatment’ a pool punishment game which did not. The former treatment led to
the emergence of pool punishment in six out of the nine groups, the latter in none. Peer
punishment slowly declined over rounds in both treatments. Roughly speaking, it was
not displaced by pool punishment, but eroded gradually. Contributions to the public
good were vastly more frequent in the treatment with second-order pool punishment. In
a nutshell, players were allowed to ’vote with their feet’ (the expression seems to be due
to Tiebout, 1956), and they decided in favor of a sanctioning institution, but only if this
institution coerced participants to contribute not merely to the public good, but also to
its own upkeep. Under this additional commitment, the institution was adopted by the
group, in a kind of ’social contract’ which was achieved without explicit communication
or deliberation, and uniquely based on social learning from the own experience and that
of others.
In section 5.2, we describe the experiment, in section 5.3, we display the results,
and in section 5.4, we oﬀer a discussion and conclusions. The theoretical background,
the instructions for the players and the detailed results of every group are contained in
Appendix B.
5.2 The experiment
The 18 groups of 12 to 14 players (our ’toy-communities’) were the independent sample
points of our experiment. Players in diﬀerent groups did neither interact nor communicate
with each other for the duration of the experiment. The players were not told that the
number of rounds was ﬁxed beforehand at 50, so as to prevent end-round eﬀects. In each
round, players were given 3 monetary units (MU) and asked to choose one of three variants
of public good (PG) games: (A) PG without punishment; (B) PG with peer punishment;
(C) PG with pool punishment. The players could also decide (D) not to participate in
any of these games. Such non-participants received an additional 0.5 MU. The idea, here,
was that when not participating in a joint enterprise, an individual can engage in some
useful activity which does not depend on the decisions of others. Once they had chosen
one of these games, they interacted (through contributions and punishment) with those
group-members who had chosen the same game. Players who opted for one of the games
(A), (B) or (C), but found no co-players to join them, were treated as non-participants
(D), and received an additional 0.5 MU, independently of what the others did. Once the
round was over, the players learned how many (in their group) had played (A), (B), (C)
or (D), which strategy they had chosen in their particular game, and which payoﬀ they
had obtained. (See payoﬀ functions of diﬀerent games in Appendix B.1). They could
use this information to decide for which game to opt in the next round. Players did not
learn about who did what, so there was no possibility to establish a reputation. Players
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knew that they would be paid immediately after the game, at a rate of 10 cents (euro)
per MU, without having to give away their identity (as players) to their co-players or to
the experimenters. The guaranteed minimal payoﬀ was 10 euro.
Players participating in a PG game of type (A) (no punishment) could decide whether
or not to contribute 1 MU to the common pool, knowing that their contribution would be
multiplied by 3 and divided equally among all other players in their game, irrespective of
whether these co-players had contributed or not. Thus contributors did not beneﬁt from
their own contribution. This slightly deviates from the ordinary type of PG games, where
the contributors receive a return from their own contribution, usually a fraction inversely
proportional to the number of participants in their PG game. Our version has the same
structure as the Mutual Aid Game (Sugden 1986) and was also considered in Wilson
(1975), Yamagishi (1986) and Fletcher and Zwick (2004). We adopted this version (which
makes the social dilemma harder to solve) because the number of participants in the PG
game can ﬂuctuate in our experiment 1, which introduces a complicating factor which we
wished to avoid (Sigmund, 2010). It may be noted that if all players contribute, everybody
gains the same in both cases (namely 2 MU), irrespective of whether one obtains a return
from the own contribution or not.
Players choosing to participate in a PG game of type (B) (peer punishment) would
ﬁrst play a PG game as described above, and then, in a second stage of the same round,
be shown the number of non-contributors (i.e., defectors) in their game. Contributors
could then decide whether or not to punish these free-riders. The ﬁne-to-fee ratio is ﬁxed
to 2:1 in (B) 2. Each punisher would have to pay a fee of 0.5 MU per defector, and that
each defector would have to pay a ﬁne of 1 MU per punisher. Again, if all cooperate,
everyone gains 2 MU.
Players participating in a PG game of type (C) (pool punishment) had to choose
between three options: (i) not to contribute anything, (ii) to contribute to the common
pool (i.e., to pay 1 MU so that 3 MU would be shared among all other members who
had chosen (C)), or (iii) to contribute to both the common pool and the punishment
pool. This last alternative requires the players to pay 1 MU to the common pool and
an additional 0.5 MU into the punishment pool. Thus if all cooperate, everyone gains
1.5 MU. This PG game was played in two variants, denoted as ’ﬁrst-order variant’ resp.
’second-order variant’. In the ﬁrst-order variant, players knew that everyone who had not
contributed to the common pool would be ﬁned 1MU per punisher. In the second-order
variant, players knew that everyone who had not contributed to both pools would be ﬁned
1MU per punisher. Hence, in the second-order variant of game (C), second-order free-
1In our experiment, a PG game has at least 2 and at most 12 to 14 players. Isaac and Walker (1988)
showed that the eﬀect of group size on individual decisions is very weak if the self return remains constant.
2The eﬀectiveness of fee-to-ﬁne ratio 1:2 has been studied by many researchers (e.g., Carpenter, 2007;
Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). This ratio is enough to maintain cooperation.
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riders were punished, while in the ﬁrst-order variant, they were not. The ﬁne to fee ratio
can greatly vary, depending on the number of defectors and pool punishers. In groups 1-9
(with altogether 120 subjects), the game of type (C) was oﬀered in the ﬁrst-order variant,
and in groups 10-18 (with 118 subjects) in the second-order variant.
We note that this is a complex game, without obvious money-maximizing strategies
for the individuals choosing (B) and (C), since payoﬀ depends on how many decide for
the diﬀerent options. In order to provide the players with an appreciation of the issues
involved, they were given, at the start of the session, 25 practice rounds (see Appendix
B.2). They knew that these rounds would not count towards their score and that groups
would be reshuﬄed before the experiment started. More precisely, players were ﬁrst given,
via computer screen, a brief introduction into game (A) (no punishment), then played ﬁve
rounds of game (A). The same then happened with games (B) (peer punishment) and (C)
(pool punishment). Finally, they all played 10 rounds with the option, in each round, to
choose between the three games (A), (B) and (C), or (D) to abstain from participation
(exactly as later in the actual experiment). Thus players could familiarize themselves with
their options, in the practice rounds, but were precluded from sharing their experiences.
Immediately after the practice rounds, the ’toy communities’ were assembled randomly,
and engaged in their 50 rounds of social learning.
After each round, players were shown the payoﬀs for all strategies used in their group,
and had 15 seconds to decide which game (A), (B). (C) or (D) to join next. The tightness
of the schedule and the complexity of the task provided a strong motivation to be guided
by the size of the payoﬀs, i.e., to engage in social learning. We also did not shrink from
using loaded language in the instructions, for instance by calling punishment ’punishment’.
Since our main aim was to compare diﬀerent sanctioning technologies, we felt justiﬁed in
acknowledging the underlying, common intention to uphold norms of collaboration. In
particular, asocial punishment or revenge were not oﬀered as options to our players. In a
similar minimalistic spirit, we avoided the issue of increasing group returns.
5.3 Results
In the actual experiment, we observed strong changes in behavior in most of the 18
groups, especially during the initial phase. 12 of the groups eventually settled down, in
the sense that the majority opted for the same game for each of the last 10 rounds. Six
of these groups settled down for pool punishment. All six belonged to the second-order
treatment. In three groups playing the second-order treatment, and three groups playing
the ﬁrst-order treatment, players settled for peer punishment. The null hypothesis that
pool punishment is equally likely in both treatments can be rejected with a signiﬁcance
of p < 0.05 (n1 = 9, n2 = 9, two-sided binomial sample test). Based on the theoretical
model, we had indeed expected pool punishment to emerge in the second-order treatment
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only.
The average frequency of pool punishment increased during the ﬁrst rounds, in the
second-order treatment, and overtook the frequency of peer punishment. In fact, the
initial frequencies of (A), (B), (C) and (D), in the ﬁrst-order treatment, corresponded
closely with the initial frequencies in the second-order treatment, but then the frequencies
evolved very diﬀerently (see Figure 5.3.1). Frequencies of peer punishers decreased in both
treatments, but only slowly. Frequencies of pool punishment decreased in the ﬁrst-order
treatment, but increased in the second-order treatment. (See Table 5.3.1 (a))
More precisely, in the ﬁrst round of the second-order treatment, 55 per cent of play-
ers choose peer punishment and 36 per cent pool punishment. The initial frequencies in
the ﬁrst-order version were 56 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively. However, in the
ﬁrst-order treatment, both frequencies declined, to reach 48 per cent and 19 per cent, re-
spectively, by round 50. By contrast, the evolution in the second-order treatment reversed
frequencies, so that after 50 rounds, 63 per cent of players opted for the pool punishment
game but only 33 per cent for the peer punishment game (Figure 5.3.1 (b)). This reversal
took place in the ﬁrst 20 rounds. The regression line is y = 0.326 + 0.0146x (where y
represents the frequency of pool-punishment and x the round), with correlation coeﬃcient
R = 0.9167 and P-value< 0.0001. Obviously, players approached both ﬁrst- and second-
order treatments with similar expectations, but then underwent a very diﬀerent learning
experience. (See Table 5.3.1 (c))
Table 5.3.1: Regression lines
Table 5.3.1 (a): Popularity of diﬀerent games
Regression line (50 rounds) R P-value
First-order peer game y = 0.6347− 0.0031x 0.4761 P-value< 0.001
First-order pool game y = 0.2749− 0.0029x 0.4362 P-value< 0.001
Second-order peer game y = 0.5220− 0.0044x 0.6671 P-value< 0.001
second-order pool game y = 0.4325 + 0.0042x 0.5939 P-value< 0.001
Table 5.3.1 (b): Frequencies of C and D
Regression line (50 rounds) R P-value
First-order C y = 0.6689− 0.0065x 0.8812 P-value< 0.001
First-order D y = 0.3292− 0.0015x 0.1761 P-value= 0.024
Second-order C y = 0.8783 + 0.001x 0.1779 P-value= 0.023
Second-order D y = 0.1164− 0.001x 0.1707 P-value= 0.029
Table 5.3.1 (c): Voting for diﬀerent games in the second-order treatment
Regression line (First 20 rounds) R P-value
Second-order peer game y = 0.6191− 0.0136x 0.8983 P-value< 0.001
Second-order pool game y = 0.3262 + 0.0146x 0.9167 P-value< 0.001
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Figure 5.3.1: Time-evolution of the frequencies of players voting for the games (A), (B),
(C) or (D). Here, (A) denotes the game without punishment (NoPun), (B) the game
with peer-punishment (Peer), (C) with pool punishment (Pool) and (D) denotes non-
participation (No).
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Notes: y represents the frequency and x the round. R is the correlation coeﬃcient.
If we average over all 50 rounds, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant preference for peer punish-
ment in the ﬁrst-order treatment, and a less signiﬁcant preference for pool punishment
in the second- order treatment (Figure 5.3.3 (a)). The latter treatment leads to a very
pronounced cooperative behaviour. Indeed, the frequency of contributions was signiﬁ-
cantly higher in the second-order treatment than in the ﬁrst-order treatment (88.2 per
cent vs.48.9 per cent, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9, p = 0.0373), and it hardly
changed over the 50 rounds (Figure 5.3.2 (b)). We can see (Figure 5.3.3 (c) and Appendix
B.2) that average payoﬀ values diﬀer by little, but that peer punishment clearly yields
the highest payoﬀ in the ﬁrst-order treatment, whereas it shares front rank with pool
punishment, in the second order treatment.
In the ﬁrst-order treatment, peer punishment was preferred by a wide margin: game
(B) was chosen in 55.6 per cent of all decisions, game (C) in 20.2 per cent and game (A)
in 11.7 per cent (Figure 5.3.3 (a)). A majority (62 per cent) of players opting for the peer
punishment game contributed to the public good, but did not punish. Their payoﬀ was
higher than that of the punishers (4.636 vs. 4.1, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9,
p = 0.077). (It is obvious that within any round, this has to hold, if some players defect;
we see here that it also holds on average). The non-contributors in the peer punishment
game earned marginally more than the non-participants, namely 3.61 MU (the diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant). All in all, 48.9 per cent of all decisions were in favour of contributing
to the public good, rather than defecting (35.6 per cent) or abstaining from the game
(15.5 per cent). But the time evolution over 50 rounds tells a more pessimistic story
(Figure 5.3.2 (a)). Three-fourth of players cooperated in the ﬁrst round but half of them
gave up in later rounds. The regression line is y = 0.669 − 0.0065x (where y represents
the frequency of cooperation and x the round), with correlation coeﬃcient R = 0.8812
and P-value < 0.0001. (Table 5.3.1 (b)) Moreover, in the ﬁrst-order pool punishment
games, cooperation did not take oﬀ. Only a tiny fraction of the decisions (54 out of 1149)
favoured investing into the punishment pool.
In the second-order treatment, the preferences change drastically. Pool punishment,
i.e., game (C), was chosen in 54.1 per cent of all decisions, and almost always (in 3155
of 3174 cases) was combined with a decision to actually contribute to the pool. Peer
punishment (B) was chosen in 41 per cent of the decisions. Interestingly, players who chose
the peer punishment game rarely decided to actually punish (only 9 per cent did), and the
average payoﬀ for those who engaged in peer punishment, 3.78 MU, was signiﬁcantly less
than that of second-order free-riders (4.77 MU, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9,
p = 0.0106). But this minority of punishers suﬃced to keep free-riding down to 16 per
cent. Few decisions (4.5 per cent) were in favour of the alternative (A), i.e., joining a
PG game without punishment. The average payoﬀ for the peer punishment game was
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Figure 5.3.2: Time-evolution of the frequencies of cooperation (C, blue), defection (D,
red) and non-participation (No, yellow) over 50 rounds in the ﬁrst- and the second-
order treatments. (a) In the ﬁrst-order treatment, defection was chosen by about one-
third of the players in each round. The number of contributions declined in favor of
non-participation. (b) In the second-order treatment, almost all the players chose to
contribute. This cooperative regime was stably sustained.
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Figure 5.3.3: (a) Frequencies of the decisions in favor of the diﬀerent games, over 50
rounds, for the ﬁrst- and the second-order treatments. In the ﬁrst-order treatment, peer
punishment is favored. In the second-order treatment, pool punishment is more frequent,
but error bars overlap. (b) Frequencies of the decisions to contribute to the public good, to
defect (i.e., not to contribute) and to opt for non-participation, averaged over 50 rounds.
Contribution is strongly promoted in the second-order treatment. (c) Payoﬀs obtained
for the diﬀerent games, averaged over ﬁfty rounds, do not greatly diﬀer. Nevertheless,
in the ﬁrst-order treatment, peer punishment games, and in the second-order treatment,
both peer and pool punishment games provided the highest average payoﬀ.
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insigniﬁcantly larger than for the pool-punishment game (4.49 vs. 4.46), but those who
actually peer-punished had a signiﬁcantly lower payoﬀ than the pool-punishers (3.78 vs.
4.49, Mann-Whitney U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9, p = 0.004).
The average payoﬀ for those choosing a given game is almost the same for both treat-
ments, with one exception: the payoﬀ for choosing pool punishment has substantially
increased in the second order treatment, because almost all players contributed to the
common pool in the second-order treatment, but less than a third did so in the ﬁrst-order
version (Figure 5.3.3 (c)).
5.4 Discussion
In principle, a public good is non-excludable. In this sense, our PG game is misnamed,
since players can decide not to participate. It may be better to call it a ’voluntary con-
tribution game’ or a ’collective-action game’, for instance, or a ’mutual aid game’, but we
wanted to use the term most common in experimental games. There certainly exist enter-
prises or resources from which one cannot abstain: the global climate is the best example.
Such compulsory interactions do not belong to the class considered here. Nevertheless,
it could well be that the main ’eﬃciency vs. stability’ result still holds for compulsory
games. We decided to consider only the voluntary interactions in our experiment for two
reasons: ﬁrst, because the theoretical results guiding our predictions were derived for this
class of games only, and second because, in the course of the experiment, we sometimes
(but rarely) encounter players who do not make up their mind quickly enough, or who
are the only individual choosing a given PG game of type (A), (B) or (C). In this case,
it is practical to assign them option (D), namely ’non-participation’. This, incidentally,
hardly aﬀects the statistics.
The important role of second-order free-riding is well-known (Oliver, 1980), and our
experiment conﬁrms it. In the second-order treatment, pool punishment eﬀectively pro-
hibits this possibility, whereas in the ﬁrst-order treatment, it does not. Apparently, pool-
punishers notice that they are exploited, in the ﬁrst-order treatment, and react against
this breach in equity (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Voting for the second-order treat-
ment implies a higher commitment. In our experimental design, we did not allow for
second-order peer punishment. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, theoretical mod-
els predict that it has no eﬀect on the outcome (Sigmund et al., 2010). On the other
hand, economic experiments have conﬁrmed this in similar situations (Cinyabuguma et
al., 2006; Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Traulsen et al., 2011).
We have reduced all individual decisions to choices between two, three or four alter-
natives. It would be interesting to investigate scenarios where players have a larger range
of strategies, for instance by allowing them to choose between ten levels of contribution
to the public good, or diﬀerent degrees of punishment. Similarly, we have proposed only
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one, extremely rudimentary form of institution. It is easy to think of better designs,
for instance by allowing part, at least, of the unused funds to return to the players who
have contributed to the punishment pool. We refrained from doing this, because we did
not want to make it too easy for institutional punishment to emerge. The fact that as
many groups ended up with peer- as with pool-punishment suggests that we succeeded in
this ’calibration’. Moreover, our experiment is already complex enough as it stands, and
we feared to make it cognitively too demanding by adding more choices. As it was, the
practice rounds needed to familiarize the players with their options took almost one hour
(as long as the subsequent experiment).
Our main objective was to compare two diﬀerent versions of pool punishment (rather
than pool with peer). We note that there exist at least three experiments (independently
conceived and as yet unpublished) comparing pool with peer punishment, or ’informal’
with ’formal’ sanctions (Kamei, Puttermann and Tyran, 2011; Markussen, Puttermann
and Tyran, 2011; Traulsen, Rohl and Milinski, 2011). In Markussen et al. 2011, ﬁxed
groups of ﬁve players play for 24 rounds, and can vote, at speciﬁc instants, between two
diﬀerent regimes (corresponding, in our setup, to decisions between (A) and (B), (B) and
(C), or (A) and (C)). In Kamei et al, their choice is between (B) and (C) with various
parameters for the sanctions. Informal sanctioning does remarkably well. (The papers
by Ertan, Page and Puttermann, 2009 and Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010 conﬁrm that
peer punishment works well when players have an opportunity for coordinating.) Formal
sanctions (which did not include second order punishment) fared poorly. The experiment
by Traulsen, Rohl and Milinski 2012 presents players with the opportunity to use both
mechanisms jointly, and ﬁnds that pool punishment prevails if it includes second-order
punishment. In contrast to these papers, we describe how players ’vote with their feet’
between competing games.
Our experiment is close in spirit and design to an experiment by Gurerk, Irlenbusch and
Rockenbach, 2006. In this experiment, players were given the choice between a PG game
with and one without peer punishment. The majority started with a clear preference
for the treatment without punishment, but switched after a few rounds to the peer-
punishment treatment, apparently guided by payoﬀ considerations. Essentially, we kept
the three-staged structure (choice of treatment, decision to contribute, decision to punish),
but added pool punishment and non-participation as additional choices. (In contrast to
the paper by Gurerk et al., 2006, we did not allow for rewarding; a related endogenous
choice between peer punishing and rewarding has been investigated by Sutter, Haigner
and Kocher, 2010.) The option of pool punishment adds an important element, as it
essentially provides the opportunity for a tacit social contract establishing a sanctioning
institution. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst experiment demonstrating that such a
social contract can emerge through social learning based on comparing the (frequency
dependent) payoﬀ values of diverse options.
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The great attention that peer punishment has attracted in economic experiments is
at least in part due to the fact that it does not presuppose the selection of an institution
over another. Such a selection is necessarily culture-speciﬁc. Instead, peer-punishment
scenarios mimic conditions of anarchy (i.e., the philosophers’ ’state of nature’). It may be
noted that nevertheless, institutions loom large in the background of such experiments:
players are submitted to strict rules, and monitored by lab assistants who eﬀectively act as
authorities. Conditions of true anarchy, as would exist among the inmates of a prison or
a kindergarten after the permanent removal of guards, can obviously not be implemented
in economic experiments.
Since we wanted to favor conditions for social learning, we provided the players with
information on the frequencies and average payoﬀs obtained by the various strategies in
their group. However, we refrained from giving them opportunities to build up individual
proﬁles, for instance reputations or signiﬁcant diﬀerences in resources. Needless to say, this
does not imply that reputations or diﬀerences in resource holding power are irrelevant for
the evolution of institutions. Similarly, we did not consider other regarding preferences
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or contests between groups, although such struggles played
doubtlessly an important role in human evolution (Choi and Bowles, 2007).
Our players were given the choice between one type of peer and one type of pool
punishment. They could order them, as from a menu. Needless to say, such an approach
cannot tell how such opportunities for sanctioning emerge, i.e., how the dishes were pre-
pared. What are the roots of sanctioning institutions? Cooperation has frequently arisen
through biological evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1995), often via subtle
mechanisms suppressing competition (Frank, 1995), and there exist many examples of
animals punishing each other (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995). In particular, parents
repress competition between their oﬀspring, in many species, and it may be that this
eventually led, in human populations, to institutionalized sanctioning. Oﬀspring would
simply have to remain with their parents (a costly option providing some safety) rather
than leave and defend their interests single-handedly. It seems that institutions, once they
have arisen, apply themselves to curb the vengeful and aggressive instincts fuelling peer-
punishment. It would be interesting to explore this, both by modeling and by experiment.
In our experimental setup, we have not allowed pool-punishers to sanction peer-punishers,
or punished players to retaliate (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Nikiforakis, 2008). We also
excluded communication and deliberation, although theoretical models, ﬁeld observations
and experiments have stressed the importance of communication in sanctioning exploiters
(Walker et al., 2000; Bochet et al., 2006; Ertan et al., 2009). If individuals can look for
allies, or deliberate with their peers, , stable systems of incentives can arise (Casari and
Luini, 2009; Ertan et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2010). We aimed for a minimalistic scenario
based on social learning, and showed that it can lead to the emergence of a rudimentary
type of institutionalized coercion helping to overcome individuals’ selﬁsh preferences.
Appendix B
B.1 Payoﬀ values
In this section, we brieﬂy sketch some of the relevant theory from Sigmund et al. (2010).
First of all, let us consider the PG game of type (A) (no punishment). There are m
players in the group. They can decide whether or not to contribute an amount c > 0,
knowing that this will be multiplied by r > 1 and divided among all other players in the
group. If mC is the number of those players who contribute, and mD the number of those
who don’t (with mC +mD = m), then the payoﬀ for a contributor is
PC = rc
mC − 1
m− 1 − c (B.1.1)
and that for a defector
PD = rc
mC
m− 1 . (B.1.2)
Clearly, we always have PD > PC (the diﬀerence is independent of mC). If all players
contribute, their payoﬀ is (r − 1)c, which is independent of group size m. The dominant
strategy is to refuse to contribute. In our experiment, c = 1 MU, r = 3 MU and m ≥ 2
is variable. Now let us consider the PG game of type (B) (peer punishment). Let us
suppose that mPe the number of players who contribute and punish those who do not
contribute, mC the number of players who contribute, but do not punish, and mD the
number of those who neither contribute nor punish (with mPe +mC +mD = m). Let β
be the size of the ﬁne that each non-contributor receives from each punisher, and γ the
fee each punisher has to pay for each non-contributor he or she punishes. Then we obtain
as payoﬀ values
PC = rc
mC +mPe − 1
m− 1 − c
P Pe = rc
mC +mPe − 1
m− 1 − c− γmD
PD = rc
mC +mPe
m− 1 − βmPe (B.1.3)
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There is no dominant strategy. The group optimum is obtained whenever mD = 0.
Clearly, we have PC ≥ P Pe (with equality if and only if mD = 0). The state when no one
contributes is a strict Nash equilibrium. Other (non-strict) equilibria exist for mD = 0
and mPe ≥ c+ββ . In our experiment, β = 1 MU and γ = 0.5MU so that states with two or
more peer punishers, but no defector are also Nash equilibria.
Finally, let us consider games of type (C) (pool punishment). There are mC players
who contribute to the common pool, but not to the punishment pool, mPo players who
contribute to both pools, and mD players who contribute to neither pool (with mPo +
mC +mD = m). Pool punishers have to contribute an amount c to the common pool and
an amount F to the punishment pool. In the ﬁrst-order variant, everyone who does not
contribute to the common pool is ﬁned by an amount BmPo, whereas in the second-order
variant, everyone who does not contribute to both pools is ﬁned by that amount. The
payoﬀ values are
P Po = rc
mC +mPo − 1
m− 1 − c− F (B.1.4)
and in the ﬁrst-order variant (C1)
PC = rc
mC +mPo − 1
m− 1 − c
PD = rc
mC +mPo
m− 1 −BmPo (B.1.5)
resp. in the second-order variant (C2)
PC = rc
mC +mPo − 1
m− 1 − c− BmPo
PD = rc
mC +mPo
m− 1 − BmPo (B.1.6)
In our experiment, we used B = 1MU and F = 0.5MU. In the ﬁrst-order variant, we have
again PC > P Po so that mD = m is the only equilibrium. In the second-order variant,
mPo = m is another equilibrium (as long as c+ F ≤ B(m− 1), which for our parameter
values means that there are at least three punishers). We note that this equilibrium is
not eﬃcient, since mC = m provides a higher per capita payoﬀ.
In Sigmund et al. (2010), it is shown that in the second-order version, pool punishment
is more stable than peer punishment, although it is less eﬃcient.
B.2 Experiments
The experiment took place in a computer lab of the Vienna University of Economics and
Business (WU) on six days. On three days, the ﬁrst-order treatment was played, and on
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the other three days the second-order treatment. The lab has 50 computers and for each
of the six sessions, some 40 students (3 groups) played together. The interactions were
anonymous, and via PCs. Cardboard dividers ensured that the students could not see
each other. Players were not allowed to communicate, or to ask questions.
Table B.2.1: Group size in the ﬁrst-order treatment and the second-order treatment
Group sizes in the ﬁrst-order treatment
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6 group 7 group 8 group 9 Total
13 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 120
Group sizes in the second-order treatment
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6 group 7 group 8 group 9 Total
13 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 120
The practice rounds lasted about 45 min, almost for as long as the subsequent ex-
periment (students knew that the sessions would at most for two hours, but were not
told the number of rounds, so as to avoid end round eﬀects). All players were given the
same instructions (in German, see screen shots in Appendix B.4). The groups were then
re-shuﬄed before the actual experiment started, and remained unchanged for its entire
duration. The translation of the instructions for the practice rounds and the experiment
can be found at the end of Appendix B.3. The average income was 19.6 euro (minimum
15.3, maximum 24.9). All steps were time-limited. Players knew that if they did not de-
cide within 15 seconds, they would be allocated a random decision. Since the players had
familiarized themselves with each game, this happened only 9 times in 11900 decisions,
and is omitted from the statistics
In the groups 1-9, which oﬀered the ﬁrst-order treatment of pool punishment, peer
punishment was preferred, as can be seen in Figure B.2.1 (a) and Table B.2.2 (a).
Table B.2.2 (a): Decisions in the ﬁrst-order treatment
Groups 1-9: Popularity of the diﬀerent games (including non-participation)
Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
(D) non-participation 754 0.126 3.500
(A) no-punishment game 701 0.117 3.342
(B) peer punishment game 3330 0.556 4.299
(C) pool punishment game 1208 0.202 3.492
Totals 5993 1 3.924
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After including among non-participants those players who found no partners
Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
(D) non-participation 926 0.155 3.500
(A) no-punishment game 618 0.103 3.32
(B) peer punishment game 3300 0.551 4.31
(C) pool punishment game 1149 0.192 3.49
Decisions within each game
Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
Contribution in (A) 99 0.017 2.601
Non-contribution in (A) 519 0.087 3.458
Contribution, but no punishing, in (B) 2049 0.342 4.636
Non-contribution in (B) 859 0.143 3.614
Peer-punishment and contribution in (B) 392 0.065 4.100
Contribution, but no punishing, in (C1) 338 0.056 3.486
Non-contribution in (C1) 757 0.126 3.566
Pool-punishment and contribution in (C1) 54 0.009 2.477
In the ﬁrst-order pool punishment games, cooperation did not take oﬀ. Only a tiny
fraction of the decisions in this group (54 out of 1149) favored investing into the punish-
ment pool. The large majority seems to have sensed that the punishment threat would
not be carried out, and defected. Defection was the most proﬁtable decision in the pool
punishment game, but the average payoﬀ (3.566 MU) was only slightly higher than what
non-participants obtained. (This diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant). Peer punishment was
clearly preferred. The average payoﬀ obtained by opting for the peer-punishment game
was 4.3 MU, higher than for opting for a pool-punishment game (3.49 MU, Mann-Whitney
U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9, p = 0.11) or the game without punishment (3.34 MU, Mann-
Whitney U-test, n1 = 9, n2 = 9, p = 0.03). Indeed, the average payoﬀ values in the pool
punishment or no-punishment games were lower than the non-participation payoﬀ of 3.5
MU. A majority (62 percent) of players opting for the peer punishment game contributed
to the public good, but did not punish. All in all, 48.9 percent of all decisions were in
favor of contributing to the public good, rather than defecting (35.6 percent) or abstain-
ing from the game (15.5 percent). But as mentioned in the main text, the time evolution
over the ﬁfty rounds shows a clear decline in contributions over time. We also note that
free-riding was the most frequent and most successful behavior in the pool punishment
game, but that the average payoﬀ (3.566 MU) was only insigniﬁcantly higher than what
non-participants obtained. Remarkably, the payoﬀ for defecting in the games without
punishment was almost the same (3.458 MU).
In the groups 10 to 18, pool-punishment was oﬀered in the second-order treatment,
i.e., it included punishing those who contributed to the common pool but not to the
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Figure B.2.1: The time-evolution, over ﬁfty rounds, of the frequencies of players voting for
the games (A), (B), (C) or (D). Game (A) is the game without punishment (NoP, blue),
(B) the game with peer-punishment (Peer, green), (C) with pool punishment (Pool, pink)
and (D) means non-participation (No, yellow). (a) The ﬁrst-order treatment, groups 3,
4 and 6 settled on the peer punishment game, (in the sense that during each of the last
10 rounds, more than half of the players opted for it). The six other groups remained
undecided. (b) The second-order treatment, groups 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17 settled on the
pool punishment game, and groups 13, 15, 18 settled on the peer punishment game.
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punishment pool. This time, pool punishment was preferred, as can be seen in Figure
B.2.1 (b) and Table B.2.2 (b). (We note that in 49 out of 215 cases, declaring oneself
to be peer punisher was cost-free, since there were no defectors to be punished.) Only
4.5 percent of all decisions were in favor of alternative (A). The free-riders, in that case,
did about as poorly as in the peer punishment game (3.696 vs 3.689), since they found
only few to exploit. Almost no decision was in favor of non-participation. In many more
cases, non-participation was the unintended consequence of choosing a game that was
not chosen by anyone else in the group. Second-order free-riding (i.e., opt for the peer
punishment game, and contribute, but do not punish) achieved the highest payoﬀ, 4.77
MU (see Figure 5.3.3 (c)).
The time-evolution in the diﬀerent groups is interesting (see Figures B.2.1 and B.2.2).
In seven of the nine groups where pool punishment was oﬀered in the ﬁrst-order treat-
ment, the initial majority voted for peer punishment and in the other two groups, the
initial majority voted for pool punishment. Three groups (3, 4 and 6) quickly reached
consensus on peer punishment but all other groups went to chaos. During ﬁfty rounds,
players persisted in switching from one game to another. We note that in the three peer
punishment groups, two-thirds of the players, in each round, decided not to opt for pun-
ishment. The threat of the remaining third suﬃced to ensure co-operation, although that
threat had rarely to be carried out.
Table B.2.2 (b): Decisions in the second-order treatment
Groups 10-18: Popularity of the diﬀerent games (including non-participation)
Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
(D) non-participation 23 0.004 3.500
(A) no-punishment game 265 0.045 3.483
(B) peer punishment game 2421 0.410 4.490
(C) pool punishment game 3189 0.541 4.459
Totals 5898 1 4.424
After including among non-participants those players who found no partners
Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
(D) non-participation 154 0.026 3.500
(A) no-punishment game 181 0.031 3.475
(B) peer punishment game 2389 0.405 4.503
(C) pool punishment game 3174 0.538 4.464
Decisions within each game
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Figure B.2.2: The time-evolution, over ﬁfty rounds, of the frequencies of the strategies.
Here AC, AD, BC, BD, CC and CD denote contribution resp. defection in (A), (B) and
(C), BP denotes peer-punishment, CP pool-punishment and No non-participation.
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Decisions Number of times Percentage Average payoﬀ
Contribution in (A) 43 0.007 2.767
Non-contribution in (A) 138 0.023 3.696
Contribution, but no punishing, in (B) 1781 0.302 4.770
Non-contribution in (B) 393 0.067 3.689
Peer-punishment and contribution in (B) 215 0.036 3.776
Contribution, but no punishing, in (C2) 11 0.002 -0.955
Non-contribution in (C2) 8 0.001 0.313
Pool-punishment and contribution in (C2) 3155 0.535 4.493
There was not much switching in the groups where the second-order treatment of
pool punishment was played. Despite the fact that in the ﬁrst round, more players
voted for peer than for pool punishment (65 vs 43), pool-punishment emerged in six
of the nine groups as consensus solution. In three groups (13, 17 and 18), the initial
majority for peer punishers was large enough to ensure the ﬁxation of peer punishment
within a few rounds. However, group 17 collapsed eventually, since the threat of peer
punishment was not actually carried out. The players then turned to the pool treatment.
A switch in the opposite direction occurred in group 15. After some initial oscillations,
the pool-punishment game emerged as the majority choice, but it was never unanimous,
and eventually became replaced by the peer-punishment treatment.
There are two related problems in establishing the statistics. One is that players
opting for a game may end up with no partners, and thus become non-participants. Their
decision was registered, and included in the statistics, but their payoﬀ (3.5 MU) was not
included in the average payoﬀ for the game of their choice, since that game was cancelled.
If we had added instead their 3.5 MU to the average, not much would have changed. The
second problem is how to count the decisions in favor of peer punishment in those peer
punishment games where no defection took place. If a player sees that there is no one
to punish, and then chooses ’peer-punishment’, this can indicate an earnest commitment
to uphold the sanctioning system to guarantee cooperation (Masclet et al., 2003), but
it could just as well be a mere cost-free gesture. If conversely a player chooses ’non-
punishment’, this can either indicate a decision for second-order free riding, or merely
mean that the player was aware that there was no need for sanctions anyway. There were
108 such rounds (out of 900). In computing average payoﬀs and frequencies, we decided to
take the players statements at face value. But we also computed a ’skeptical’ version (not
shown here), where players who actually did not punish were counted as non-punishers,
no matter whether they declared themselves to be peer-punishers or not. Frequencies and
the average payoﬀs are diﬀerent, but the main conclusions remain unaﬀected.
The experiment was motivated by a theoretical analysis (Sigmund et al, 2010). This
analysis predicts that the emergence of pool punishment is possible only if second-order
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free-riders are also punished. This is conﬁrmed in our experiment. On the other hand, we
expected that peer punishment would be replaced, in that case, by pool punishment. As
it turned out, we did not observe this anticipated ’trading eﬃciency for stability’. Rather,
we found examples for switches in both directions (groups 15 and 17, see Appendix B.2).
A look at the time evolution in each group (see Appendix B.2, Figures B.2.1 and B.2.2)
suggests that in both treatments, peer punishment oﬀered a modicum of stability, but
that when it failed, it gave way to asocial behavior (i.e., non-participation or defection)
in the ﬁrst-order treatment, and to pool punishment in the second-order treatment. As a
consequence, contributions were stably sustained in the second-order treatment, at a very
high level, whereas they declined, and were ultimately overtaken by defections, in the ﬁrst-
order treatment (see Figure 5.3.2). This good performance of peer punishment may be
due to the fact that retaliatory punishment was not possible in our design (Cinyabuguma
et al., 2006; Nikiforakis, 2008). Moreover, in contrast to the theoretical model (Sigmund
et al., 2010), pool-punishers could not punish peer-punishers in our experiment. They
belonged to diﬀerent games. It is possible that ’cross-punishment’ can change this outcome
(Traulsen et al., 2011).
The initial phase of our experiment displayed a high rate of change in behavior in most
groups. On average, more than one-fourth of the players switched to another decision
between one round and the next, during the ﬁrst twenty rounds. In the last ten rounds,
the average switching rate was only 5.6 percent in the twelve groups that had settled on
peer or pool punishment, but 50 percent in the others.
Another question that was not addressed here is whether the option to abstain from
the game (’non-participation’), which is crucial for the theoretical analysis (Sigmund et
al., 2010), is also necessary for the experiment. For the analysis, it was assumed that
innovative behavior (’mutation’) is much rarer than copying behavior. In that case, non-
participation is necessary as an escape from the homogeneous state of defection. Since
actual human populations display high degrees of polymorphism (Traulsen et al., 2010),
non-participation may not be needed. On the other hand, voluntary participation is likely
to increase the perceived legitimacy of the sanctioning institution, and hence its eﬃciency
(Tyler and Degoey, 1995; Ertan et al., 2009).
B.3 Instructions
B.3.1 Instructions for the practice rounds (translated into En-
glish).
Welcome and thank you for showing up. Your minimal payoﬀ will be 10 euros (guaran-
teed). We ﬁrst start with some practice games. These do not count towards your score.
You can experiment.
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COMMUNITY GAME
In each round, you receive 3 MU and must decide whether or not to contribute 1 MU
to your co-players’ payoﬀ.
I CONTRIBUTE means: you pay 1 MU and 3 MU will be distributed equally among
all your co-players.
I DON’T CONTRIBUTE means: you keep 1 MU. This will not change your co-player’s
score.
You have 30 seconds for each round to decide and CONFIRM. If you do not decide in
time, the computer will make a random decision. After each round, you will see the scores.
EXAMPLE
If all contribute, all end up with 5 MU. If no one contributes, all end up with 3 MU.
In mixed groups, contributors always end up with less than the non-contributors.
DO YOU WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR GROUP?
YES
NO
The round is played.
The scores are displayed.
This is repeated 5 times, with a reﬂection time of 30 seconds per round.
COMMUNITY GAME WITH OPTION TO PUNISH
This game consists of 2 stages. At the start of each round you receive 3 units. The ﬁrst
stage is the community game, as above. You can decide whether or not to contribute 1
unit. You will then see the scores in your group, and how many contributed. In the second
stage, contributors can decide whether or not to punish all those who did not contribute.
If you punish, you have to pay 0.5 MU per non-contributor. Each non-contributor is then
ﬁned 1 MU. You will then see the ﬁnal score of the round.
EXAMPLE
If 4 players punish a non-contributor, this costs each punisher 0.5 MU, and the pun-
ished player 4 MU.
If 3 players punish 2 non-contributors, this costs each punisher 1 MU and each punished
player 3 MU.
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If 2 players punish 3 non-contributors, this costs each punisher 1.5 MU and each pun-
ished player 2 MU.
DO YOU WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR GROUP?
YES
NO
x players out of y contributed.
DO YOU WANT TO PUNISH ALL NON-CONTRIBUTORS?
YES
NO
The round is played.
The scores are displayed.
This is repeated 5 times, with a reﬂection time of 30 seconds for each decision.
COMMUNITY GAME WITH PUNISHMENT DEVICE
At the start of each round you receive 3 MU. Again, you can decide to contribute 1
MU to the group or not. Contributors can additionally decide to pay for a punishment
device. This costs the contributor 0.5 MU.
In the ﬁrst-order treatment: Each punishment device will punish all non-contributors
by 1 MU.
In the second-order treatment: Each punishment device will punish all non-punishers
by 1 MU (irrespective of whether they contributed or not).
EXAMPLE FOR THE SECOND ORDER TREATMENT
If 3 players chose a punishment mechanism, each pays 0.5 MU and 3 MU will be
removed from the account of each player who did not chose the punishment mechanism.
Even if every player choses the punishment mechanism and no-one will be punished, the
costs for the punishment mechanism will have to be paid.
DO YOU WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROUP? DO YOU WANT A
PUNISHMENT DEVICE?
JUST CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROUP
NEITHER, NOR
BOTH
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The round is played.
The scores are displayed.
This is repeated 5 times, with 30 seconds per decision.
B.3.2 Instructions for the full game with option to choose a
game (still in the practice rounds)
You will now have to decide, for each round, which game to play. You will receive 3 units
for each round. You can choose to join
A: COMMUNITY GAME WITH NO PUNISHMENT
B: COMMUNITY GAME WITH OPTION TO PUNISH
C: COMMUNITY GAME WITH PUNISHMENT DEVICE
You can also decide not to play the game. In this case, you receive an additional 0.5
MU, but you cannot improve.
13 players participate in each round. But the sizes of the groups playing A, B or C are
variable. If no co-player joins your group, you receive 0.5 MU and your game is cancelled.
At the end of each round, you will see the scores.
OPT FOR YOUR GAME:
A: COMMUNITY GAME WITH NO PUNISHMENT
B: COMMUNITY GAME WITH OPTION TO PUNISH
C: COMMUNITY GAME WITH PUNISHMENT DEVICE
D: NO GAME
The round is played.
The scores are displayed.
This is repeated 10 times, with 30 seconds per decision.
B.3.3 Instructions for the experiment (after the practice rounds)
Now you will be paid according to your score (1 MU is 10 cents, so that 10 MU = 1 euro).
The average payoﬀ will be around 20 euros.
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OPT FOR YOUR GAME:
A: COMMUNITY GAME WITH NO PUNISHMENT
B: COMMUNITY GAME WITH OPTION TO PUNISH
C: COMMUNITY GAME WITH PUNISHMENT DEVICE
D: NO GAME
The round is played.
The scores are displayed.
Repeat this for 50 rounds, with 15 seconds per decision
B.4 Screen shots
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Figure B.4.1: Login page
Figure B.4.2: Practice rounds, instruction, game (A)
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Figure B.4.3: Practice rounds, game (A)
Figure B.4.4: Practice rounds, instruction, game (B)
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Figure B.4.5: Practice rounds, game (B)
Figure B.4.6: Practice rounds, instruction, game (C), ﬁrst-order variant
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Figure B.4.7: Practice rounds, instruction, game (C), second-order variant
Figure B.4.8: Practice rounds, game (C)
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Figure B.4.9: Practice rounds, instruction, full game with option to choose a game
Figure B.4.10: Practice rounds, full game with option to choose a game
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Figure B.4.11: Experiment, instruction
Figure B.4.12: Experiment, resulting page
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